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Introduction
Developed societies are undergoing profound changes. The decrease in childbirths observed in al-
most all developed economies is leading to a rapid aging of population. This poses several challenges
to their labor markets, since the burden of informal elderly care on active labor force is constantly
increasing over time and threatens economic development in the long run. Migratory flows from
developing countries can partly revert these trends. Nevertheless, new migration waves can raise
readjustment problems to the receiving labor markets and can be opposed by the incumbent pop-
ulation.
In this thesis, I investigate some aspects of the two main challenges faced by developed soci-
eties: aging and migration. In the first chapter, I consider the cultural determinants of elderly
care arrangement decisions. From a policy point of view, understanding the determinants of such
decisions can help tuning elderly care services to the needs of the elderly, relieving the elderly care
burden of informal care givers, i.e. working age family members. In the second and third chapter,
instead, I consider some aspects of the impact of migration on the labor market. Particularly, in
the second chapter I investigate the role of language abilities in determining the substitutability
between native and foreign workers. In the third chapter, I consider the role of product market
conditions on the employment of migrant workers. Both aspects are crucial to design migration
policies able to limit the displacement effect of migrant workers on native workers and to foster the
economic potential of the economy.
Also, in the three chapters I consider different economic contexts and implement different em-
pirical strategies. The first two chapters exploit the cultural diversity of Switzerland to infer their
conclusions on elderly care arrangements and migrant-native substitutability. The third chapter,
instead, exploits a structural change in international trade patterns and focuses on the United
States.
The empirical strategy of the first chapter “The role of culture in long-term care arrangement
decisions” (with Giuliano Masiero and Fabrizio Mazzonna) is based on Swiss data and consists in
a spatial regression discontinuity at the linguistic border between French and German speaking
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municipalities of bilingual cantons. In this way, we compare the decisions of people belonging to
different cultural groups to enter a nursing home. German speaking elder individuals usually enter
the nursing homes in better health conditions with respect to their French speaking counterparts
and this result is likely to be due to differences in the strength of family values. This suggests that
people with a different cultural background may give different behavioral responses to the same
public intervention. Thus, the policy maker should be aware of such differences to correctly target
policy interventions in the elderly care market.
The second and the third chapters investigate the issue of migration and both advise the policy
makers on different aspects that migration policies should account for. The second paper, “What
drives the substitutability between foreign and native workers? Evidence about the role of language”
(with Fabrizio Mazzonna), studies the role of language in driving the substitutability between native
and foreign workers. In other words, it checks whether workers sharing the linguistic background
of native workers are better substitutes for native workers than foreign workers with a different
linguistic background. To this aim, I modify the model developed by Ottaviano and Peri (2012)
and estimate some structural parameters, comparing workers of different nationalities and different
linguistic backgrounds. The results show that migrant workers with the same linguistic background
of native workers do not specialize in different occupations and are potentially perfect substitutes
for native workers. By contrast, migrant workers with a different linguistic background (but also
native workers with a different linguistic background) tend to specialize in more manual intensive
tasks and are somewhat complementary to resident natives.
Finally, in the third paper, “The role of Chinese import competition on the employment of mi-
grant workers”, I try to understand whether the firms play an active role in demanding migrant
labor. In particular, I analyze the role of product market competition in determining the employ-
ment of migrant workers. To this aim, I follow the empirical strategy of Autor et al. (2013) and
exploit the upsurge of China as a world leading manufacturing exporter to evaluate the effects of
greater product market competition on the employment of migrant workers in the manufacturing
sector. However, since Chinese import exposure can be correlated with manufacturing employ-
ment, I instrument import penetration from China to the US with import penetration from China
to other high income countries. The empirical results show that an increase in import competition
is positively related to the employment of foreign workers. This seems to be related to the greater
productivity of foreign workers. Thus, firms facing an increase in competition in the final good
market may prefer to retain more productive migrant workers. This could worsen the displacement
of native workers induced by a negative event in the final product market, raising anti-immigration
feelings among native population.
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Chapter 1
The role of culture in long-term care
arrangement decisions
1.1 Introduction
Population aging and the change in the family structure are expected to increase long-term care
(LTC) expenditure substantially in the next 50 years, raising the burden on society to cover elderly
care services. In 2010, public LTC expenditure accounted, on average, for 1.8% of GDP across the
EU-27 and this expenditure is expected to double by 2060 (Oliveira Martins and de la Maison-
neuve, 2013). However, the LTC market is still considered too small if we take into account the
high expenditure associated with the old age dependency risk (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007). A
quite voluminous literature (see Norton, 2016 for a review) has investigated the LTC insurance
puzzle focusing on several supply side (e.g., imperfect competition and asymmetric information)
and demand side (e.g., limited rationality, biased risk perception and informal care) factors. More
recently, attention has been also devoted to the role of cultural factors,1 mainly to explain the large
cross-country variation in the size of this market (Costa-Font, 2010). This paper shows how and
to what extent cultural factors may influence the LTC market. To this aim we compare LTC ar-
rangement decisions across language regions in Switzerland using a spatial regression discontinuity
design (RDD).
LTC arrangements can be distinguished between residential care provided in nursing homes
and home-based care provided at the individual’s home. While residential care is always formally
provided, home-based care can be either formal or informal - that is, provided by family members.
Generally speaking, LTC arrangements respond to different needs and the choice among them is the
1Following the growing literature on the economic effects of culture (e.g., Alesina and Giuliano, 2015), we refer to
culture as customary beliefs, attitudes and system of social norms that characterize a particular group and that are
transmitted from generation to generation.
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result of different factors. The health condition of the older person is of fundamental importance
in deciding the amount of formal and informal care required (Bonsang, 2009; Norton, 2000). In
many cases, elderly people choose residential care only when their health condition is too critical
to be cared at home (Ryan and Scullion, 2000). Another important determinant is the availability
of substitutes for care. Indeed, cohabiting with other people increases the probability of receiving
informal care, while living alone is significantly associated with higher formal home-based care and
nursing home use (Kemper, 1992). Finally, payment schemes for formal health care services are
also found to influence LTC use (e.g., Siciliani, 2013; Orsini, 2010).
Social scientists have also explored the cultural-driven north-south gradient in LTC arrange-
ments across European countries. The elderly are more likely to be instituzionalized (i.e. in nursing
homes), and more likely to use formal health care services in Continental and Scandinavian coun-
tries than in Mediterranean countries (e.g., Bolin et al., 2008). Costa-Font (2010) offers a cultural
explanation for this phenomenon and, more generally, for the limited development of the LTC in-
surance market in many countries. He finds that family ties appear to influence the decisions to
purchase LTC insurance, and that European countries with stronger family ties exhibit lower levels
of formal LTC coverage. This is consistent with the sociologists’ view according to which “weak”
and “strong” family ties countries show very different cultural norms about the role of the family
in taking care of the elderly (Reher, 1998). Nevertheless, in these studies the presence of significant
differences among Southern, Central and Northern European countries in LTC utilization might be
driven by the large differences in institutional settings. Indeed, economic conditions, institutional
factors and cultural norms are very difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle using cross-country
studies.
We overcome this problem by exploiting the unique institutional setting provided by Switzer-
land. Switzerland is a confederation of 26 states called cantons, and counts four distinct cultural
groups corresponding to four different languages spoken, namely German, French, Italian and Ro-
mansh. These language groups are geographically well-delimited, and the discontinuity in the
probability of speaking a given language is quite sharp at language borders. Moreover, there are
large differences between cultural groups, particularly between German speaking communities and
communities speaking a language of Latin origin (French, Italian and Romansh).
Eugster et al. (2011) show how the large cultural difference between these two broad language
groups shapes the demand for social insurance. In particular, the support of redistribution poli-
cies and for the expansion of the social insurances is larger among Latin-speaking Swiss residents
compared with their German-neighbors in adjacent municipalities. Moreover, the authors show the
presence of stronger family ties among Swiss-Latin individuals. Using Swiss data from the Euro-
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pean Value Survey (EVS) and the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), we also document
the presence of clear differences between Latin and German speaking people living in Switzerland
for some selected questions about family value and elderly care. Figure 1.1 clearly shows that Latin
speaking respondents are more likely to consider the family as very important in their life. They
also believe that elderly care should be provided by family members (especially adult children), and
spend a larger amount of time in providing care for family members than people living in German
areas.
In this paper, we argue that the before described difference in family values across the two main
Swiss cultural groups - German and Latin - gives rise to large differences in the demand for LTC
arrangements. First, we use a simple theoretical framework to predict how different individual
preferences may affect the dependency level at entry (i.e., health conditions) in nursing homes
and, as a consequence, the relative provision of home-based care compared to nursing homes.
In particular, if stronger family ties imply stronger preferences for care at home, Latin speaking
individuals are expected to enter a nursing home in worse health conditions and use more formal
home-based care with respect to German speaking individuals. Then, using Swiss administrative
data on nursing homes and formal home-based care providers, we provide empirical evidence that
supports our theoretical predictions.
While cantons have large power in many economic sectors, including the organization of LTC
services, linguistic borders do not always coincide with cantonal administrative borders. Partic-
ularly, there are three French and German speaking bilingual cantons and one Italian, Romansh
and German speaking trilingual canton (see Figure 1.2). As in Eugster et al. (2011), we disen-
tangle the effect of culture from the effect of different institutional settings using a spatial RDD
at the linguistic border between German and French speaking municipalities in the three bilingual
cantons. Thus, contrasting LTC choices of people living on different sides of the linguistic border
within the same canton (i.e., holding supply and institutional factors constant), we can identify
the impact of culture on LTC arrangement decisions. We do not use the variation coming from the
trilingual canton (Graubu¨nden) because the identification would be based on too few municipalities
and potentially confounded by important geographical discontinuities (i.e. the Alps).
Our results are robust to a large battery of robustness checks. We show that there are no
discontinuities in our covariates and institutional characteristics that might potentially confound
our analysis, such as socio-demographics characteristics, income, home ownership, prevalence of
several (aging related) diseases, mortality and several supply side characteristics. Our results are
also robust to the bandwidth choice and to different parametric and non-parametric specifications.
To provide further evidence that our results are driven by cultural differences in family values,
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we also investigate the mechanisms behind our results. Many alternative explanations are rejected
when testing the continuity assumption. Then, we use survey data to investigate several household
characteristics that are known to affect LTC choices. Again, we do not find evidence of differences
in household composition and size across linguistic groups. We do instead find evidence of a larger
presence of informal care from household members and relatives in Latin speaking regions, a result
that supports the family ties explanation.
This paper provides a new contribution to the literature about the determinants of LTC use,
showing the importance of culture on LTC arrangement decisions. The role of culture in shaping
economic outcomes has been widely debated in the literature (e.g., Alesina and Giuliano, 2015;
Carroll et al., 1994; Fernandez and Fogli, 2009; Giuliano, 2007). For instance, Giuliano (2007)
investigates how culture affects living arrangements, showing that children of Southern European
immigrants in the United States tend to cohabit with their parents up to older ages as compared
to children of Northern European immigrants. Indeed, our evidence allows to shed some light on
one of the driving forces behind the substitutability between different LTC arrangements.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section explains the institutional
background and provides some basic insights about the organization and the distribution of formal
LTC in Switzerland. Section 1.3 provides a simple theoretical framework to understand the role of
culture in shaping LTC arrangement decisions, while Section 1.4 presents the data. The empirical
strategy is presented in Section 1.5 while Section 1.6 presents the results. Finally, Section 1.7
concludes.
1.2 Institutional and cultural background
Language, culture and administrative borders
In Switzerland there are 26 cantons and 4 official languages: German, French, Italian and Romansh.
In 2013, the Swiss population amounted to about 8 million people. German was spoken by 63.5%
of the population, French by 22.5%, Italian by 8.1% and Romansh only by 0.5%. Linguistic areas
are well-delimited on the territory: the German speaking part is located in the Centre-East of the
country, French is spoken in the West, Italian in the South and Romansh in some valleys of the
South-East.
However, linguistic areas do not always coincide with cantonal administrative borders. Specifi-
cally, three cantons — Berne, Fribourg and Valais —overlap with both French and German speaking
areas, while the canton of Graubu¨nden overlaps with German, Italian and Romansh speaking areas
(see Figure 1.2). The language discontinuity in the Graubu¨nden canton is limited to some specific
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valleys. On the contrary, the language discontinuity between French speaking areas in the Western
part of the country and German speaking areas in the Central part runs from North to South
without geographical barriers separating the two linguistic areas. The mountain barrier of the Alps
is located in the South, and runs from East to West, while the Northern part is mainly covered by
hills. Thus, there are no morphological differences between the two sides of this linguistic border.
The linguistic border has historical roots and can be considered as fairly exogenous. As discussed
by Eugster et al. (2011, 2016) it traces back to the Roman time (around VI-VII century A.D.)
while cantonal boundaries emerged only during the late Middle Ages.
It is also worth noting that the linguistic border does not coincide with a religious border. How-
ever, Swiss-Latin border towns are characterised by roughly 14 percentage points fewer Protestants
as compared to Swiss-German border towns. This percentage is compensated by a correspond-
ing higher share of Catholics (Eugster et al., 2011) with large heterogeneity across municipalities.
Even though cultural norms might be shaped by religion membership, this does not appear to be
an explanation for the the large difference in family values and LTC arrangements across the two
linguistic groups. In particular, all the results reported in this paper are robust to the inclusion of
controls for religion (Table 1.A.4).
Our analysis involves 4 administrative levels: the Confederation, cantons, districts and mu-
nicipalities. The Confederation sets general guidelines, Cantons are the states of the Swiss Con-
federation with large autonomy in terms of healthcare organization and policy, while districts are
aggregations of municipalities within a canton. Districts do not have any legislative or executive
power, nor any democratically elected authority. Still they play a role in the organization of some
services, such as home-based care. Finally, municipalities are entitled to organize and guarantee
the provision of LTC on their territory. To this end, they can coordinate with other municipalities
or with the canton.
LTC organization
The Swiss health care system is based on private health care insurance, which is compulsory for
all citizens. The LTC delivery system is highly decentralized and cantons started a federal coor-
dination only recently. The Confederation only sets the general guidelines, such as the maximum
contribution of patients and health insurers to both residential care and home-based care. Cantons
are in charge of the organization of LTC services and guarantee health insurance subscription to
those who cannot afford it.2 Within the guidelines imposed by the Confederation, each canton
may set different contributions for patients and health insurers. In particular, German speaking
2Notice that more than 50% of patients in nursing homes receive subsidies from local governments.
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regions have so far relied more heavily on nursing homes, whereas French and Italian speaking
areas have developed more home care services. According to the last change in the federal law on
LTC provision,3 about 65% of the cost of health care provided by either nursing homes or home-
based health care services is covered by compulsory health insurance, and their reimbursement is
regulated by the federal law on the compulsory health insurance.4 Patients or residents themselves
can be made to cover up to 20% of such costs (a ceiling of approximately 8,000 CHF per year).
The remainder is covered by public authorities (cantons and municipalities). However, the canton
establishes whether the residual costs for LTC are covered by the canton itself or by the patient’s
municipality of residence. Conversely, residential costs and help at home for activities of daily liv-
ing (ADL) and instrumental activities of daily living (IADL) are generally covered by the patients
through out-of-pocket expenditures (that might depend on income or wealth) or supplementary
LTC insurances. However, cantons might decide to provide subsidies to cover at least partially the
residual out-of-pocket expenditure.
1.3 Theoretical framework
Several theoretical models provide guidance for optimal LTC arrangement policies (e.g., Jousten
et al., 2005; Kuhn and Nuscheler, 2011), but none of them explicitly considers the role of culture
in shaping LTC arrangement decisions. In this section we provide a simple theoretical framework
to investigate the impact of culture on two outcomes: the dependency level at entry in nursing
homes and, as a consequence, the relative provision of home-based care with respect to nursing
home care. Although a discussion about the amount of informal care received from relatives is
beyond the scope of this paper, this framework can be easily extended to encompass informal care
provision. Further details are provided in the footnotes.
Consider the following quasi-linear utility function:
U(C,LTC) = C + dφ(LTC) d ∈ [0, 1] (1.1)
where C is consumption, φ is an increasing and strictly concave function of LTC, and d is the
intensity of care required by the elderly person, i.e. the dependency level. Equation (1.1) can be
interpreted as either the household utility or the elderly person’s utility, depending on the subject
making LTC choices. LTC can be measured in day units or in multiple-day units. Besides, if the
elderly person is in good health, i.e. d = 0, the household does not spend any amount of income in
LTC services.
3The federal law was approved in June 13, 2008 and came into force in 2011.
4SR 832.10 - Federal law dated March, 18th 1994.
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LTC services can be further subdivided into home-based care (HB) and nursing home care
(NH):
LTC = δHB + (1− δ)NH, δ ∈ [0, 1] (1.2)
where δ is the preference parameter for home-based care, which captures the influence of culture.
Indeed, individuals with stronger family ties are expected to show a higher value of δ with respect
to individuals with weaker family ties. Home-based care and nursing home care are assumed to
be perfect substitutes, since elderly people entering a nursing home do not receive any home-based
care, and vice-versa.5
Assuming that the price of consumption is the numeraire, the budget constraint is
C + ph(d)HB + pnNH = ω, p
′
h(d) > 0 (1.3)
where ph(d) is the price of home-based care, which is an increasing function of the dependency level,
d. pn is the price of nursing homes, and ω is the endowment of the household. If HB and NH
are expressed in days of care, ph(d) can be interpreted as the price of one day of home-based care,
which becomes progressively more expensive as the elderly’s health condition deteriorates. In other
words, worse health conditions may require more hours of care, increasing the daily cost of home-
based care.6 For simplicity, we assume pn to be independent of the elderly’s health condition, since
fixed costs in a nursing home usually outweigh variable costs due to adverse health conditions.7
The Swiss LTC organization fits well this framework. Generally, the price paid for nursing home
care does not vary with the intensity of care required by the elderly person and is based on a daily
tariff. Conversely, home-based care is provided in hours. Therefore, the more adverse the health
conditions of the patient, the larger the number of daily hours of home-based care required, and
the higher the daily price of home-based care. As a result, it seems reasonable to assume that for
low levels of dependency the price of one day in home-based care is lower than the price of one
day in nursing homes, while for high levels of dependency home-based care is more expensive than
nursing home care.
5Notice that this framework can be easily expanded to encompass the distinction between formal and informal
care provision. Indeed, the home-based care variable HB can be further decomposed as HB = [θIF ρ + (1 −
θ)FMρ]
1
ρ , where IF is the amount of informal care, FM is the amount of formal home-based care, θ is a preference
parameter for informal care and ρ is the elasticity of substitution between the two. This framework allows for
imperfect substitutability between formal and informal home-based care. Nevertheless, a thorough investigation of
the interaction between formal and informal care is beyond the scope of this paper.
6In the case of formal home-based care this cost is monetary, while in the case of informal care this cost can be
measured as the monetary value of the time spent by the caregiver.
7To relax this assumption, let the nursing home price depend on the severity of the elderly’s health status. Since
fixed costs play a greater role in nursing homes than in home-based care, daily home-based care prices increase more
rapidly with the severity of the elderly’s health condition than daily nursing home prices, i.e. p′h(d) > p
′
n(d).
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The effect of culture on LTC choices
Using Equations (1.1)–(1.3), we can see that households are indifferent between nursing homes and
home-based care if
δpn = (1− δ)ph(d). (1.4)
In words, the elderly person enters a nursing home if the left-hand side of the equation is smaller
than the right-hand side, that is when the weighted price of one day in nursing home care is smaller
than the weighted price of one day in home-based care. Prices are weighted by preferences for
home-based care. Indeed, the higher the preference for home-based care, the smaller the nursing
home price to induce entrance in a nursing home. Therefore, the threshold dependency level beyond
which the elderly person enters the nursing home can be obtained from Equation (1.4) as
d∗ = p−1h
(
δ
1− δ pn
)
. (1.5)
Notice that the inverse of a strictly increasing function is still an increasing function, and therefore
the dependency level at entry is positively related to the preference parameter for staying at home.
This means that the threshold dependency level above which the elderly person is willing to enter a
nursing home is higher for individuals with strong family ties (and thus high preference parameter
for home-based care) than individuals with low family ties (small δ). Figure 1.3 shows graphically
the results using a simple functional form for ph(d). For combinations of d and δ above the curve,
the elderly person enters a nursing home, while for combinations of d and δ below the curve, the
elderly person receives home-based care. In the empirical part of the paper, we are going to test
the validity of this relationship.
Note that the household decision can be decomposed in two parts: first, the decision whether
to purchase home-based or nursing home care, and second, the decision about the quantity of the
chosen type of care to purchase. If we focus only on the second part of the problem, the quantity of
service to buy, we can see that for positive values of the dependency level d the utility function is
strictly concave. This means that preferences in the amount of service to purchase are single-peaked.
Thus, assuming that individual preferences are aggregated according to a majoritarian voting rule,
and that households correctly reveal their preferences, the median voter theorem applies and the
optimal per capita provision of care corresponds to the preferences of the median-ranked household.
From a supply viewpoint this implies that, if the government (or the market) aggregates citizens’
preferences for home-based care, the higher the average δ in the population the higher the provision
of home-based care, ceteris paribus.
To sum up, from this simple theoretical framework we obtain two preliminary results: (a) the
dependency level at entry in nursing homes is higher for people with stronger preference for home-
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based care, and (b) if people are allowed to freely choose their preferred LTC arrangement option,
LTC provision should reflect population preferences.
In the remaining of this paper, we exploit the within canton variation in the language spoken
to show that Latin and German speaking areas are characterized by quite different social values
and preferences, which give rise to remarkable differences in the demand for different LTC services.
However, if result (b) applies, differences in the supply of LTC services across cantons should also
reflect, at least partially, cultural differences across cantons. As a consequence, our identification
strategy —that exploits only the cultural variation within cantons— should only capture a lower
bound of the total effect of culture on LTC markets.
1.4 Data and descriptive statistics
1.4.1 Data
The main data source is the statistics on socio-medical institutions (SOMED) available from the
Swiss Federal Statistical Office. SOMED is an administrative dataset containing data from nursing
homes between 2006 and 2013. Each nursing home is required to transmit information about its
clients, costs, revenues and personnel employed. Data about health care provision to clients are
detailed and include length of stay, intensity of care received, type of arrangement within the nursing
home, provenience and destination of the elderly. From 2007 on, a personal number is assigned
to each client, allowing for consistent tracking of individuals over time. Given the nature of this
dataset, there is limited information about socio-demographic characteristics of clients. However,
for each individual we observe the place of residence before entering the nursing home, age, and
gender.
Dependency level at entry
Following the insight of our theoretical model, the main dependent variable of interest is the de-
pendency level at entry, which we define as the intensity of initial care received by the patient.
To measure the dependency level, we use a harmonized scale that ranges from 0 to 4. During the
period of interest (2007-2013), the measurement instruments adopted for reporting the intensity of
care in nursing homes were not uniform across cantons. Nevertheless, given that each instrument
can be converted into minutes of care provided, it was possible to harmonize the dependency levels
and to collapse them into one major scale ranging from 0 to 4. In particular, each point of the
scale corresponds to one additional hour of care per day. It is worth noting that the measurement
instrument does not change at the linguistic border in the three bilingual cantons. We restrict the
analysis of the dependency level at entry to people aged 50+ entering a nursing home with the
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intent to stay for a long time. Moreover, we focus on the dependency level “at entry” to avoid
the confounding factor of nursing home treatment. More details regarding the construction of the
dependency level at entry are provided in Appendix 1.A.1.
We also consider two other proxies of the dependency level: age at entry and place of residence
before entering the nursing home. The idea behind using age at entry is that the older an individual,
the higher the likelihood of physical and mental impairments. However, we expect age to be a
more noisy indicator of frailty with respect to the dependency level, because life events and health
behaviors adopted during the whole life-cycle may affect individual’s health at older ages. For
instance, if people that would have entered at older ages in nursing homes show worse health-
related behaviours, they may enter a nursing home at younger age, because their health status
deteriorates faster than people with better health-related behaviour. Indeed, while Latin-speaking
communities might be more reluctant to enter a nursing home compared to their German speaking
counterparts, they also show worse health-related behaviours (Abel et al., 2013).
Also, the place of residence before entry is an interesting indicator of individual preferences
towards LTC arrangements. In areas with greater preference for staying at home, the entrance in
nursing home is postponed until the health conditions of the elderly person are too problematic
to be cared at home. Thus, in these areas we expect more people entering a nursing home from
hospital or from other rehabilitative institutions. On the contrary, where people decide to enter a
nursing home in relatively healthier conditions, we expect more people to enter from home. The
results based on age at entry and place of residence are very similar to those reported in the main
text using the dependency level (see Appendix for further details).
Auxiliary data
We use additional datasets to explain why people in Latin speaking areas enters a nursing home in
worse health conditions. First, we exploit the home care survey (HCS) which collects administrative
data from home-based care providers. The time span of this database is from 2007 to 2013. Data
about clients are aggregated by provider, and therefore it is not possible to make any inference
about the intensity of care received by each person. The only available information is the number
of clients receiving care, hours provided, and the number of cases by type of care, and (for some
types of care) age group. Since home-base providers usually take care of clients residing in different
municipalities (to exploit economies of scale from service provision, especially in rural environments)
we aggregate the information at district level.
Second, we use voting data from national referenda. Switzerland has a long-standing tradition
of direct democracy and many referenda take place every year. In the main text, we use data
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from the 2013 referendum on family policies about the approval of an amendment to the Swiss
Constitution promoting the reconciliation between work and family duties and considering the
needs of families in government policies. Specifically we use the share of people voting yes in each
municipalities. Eugster et al. (2011) show that there are sharp differences in referendum outcomes
on social issues between French and German speaking municipalities in bilingual cantons. These
differences can be attributed to cultural differences between the two linguistic areas. As a result,
referendum outcomes should be a reasonable proxy for preferences in this context. Other referenda
involving the family (e.g., a referendum in 1996 on the introduction of the maternity leave) lead to
similar conclusions.
Third, we use survey data providing information on household characteristics and informal care.
In particular, we exploit the 2000 Public use sample (PUS) of the Swiss census (a random drawn
sample of 5% of the population) to obtain additional information on household characteristics in the
three bilingual cantons, and the fourth wave (2010) of the Survey of Health Ageing and Retirement
in Europe (SHARE) for information on the level of informal care. All the other control variables
at municipal and hospital level are obtain from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO) and are
described in the Appendix 1.A.2.
1.4.2 Descriptive statistics
In Table 1.1, we report basic descriptive statistics at individual level by linguistic area in the three
bilingual French- and German speaking cantons. The variables of interest are Dependency level
at entry, Age at entry, Residing at home and Gender. On average, French speaking individuals
show higher dependency level at entry, age at entry, and are less likely to be at home prior to
institutionalization. However, a mean comparison test cannot reject the null of equal means for
Age at entry and Gender.8
Graphical evidence at district level for the whole country seems to indicate that people in
Latin regions (and particularly in the French speaking area) enter nursing homes in worse health
conditions, and use formal home care more often than people living in German regions (Figure
1.4).9 One could argue that this pattern may be driven by average worse health conditions of
people living in Latin speaking areas. As a robustness check, we use the share of people over 65 in
nursing homes instead of the dependency rate and obtain very similar results (Figure 1.A.1). Such
evidence suggests that people in Latin speaking regions enter the nursing home in worse health
conditions because they postpone their entrance, rather than being in worse health conditions
8The standard errors in these tests are robust and clustered at municipal level.
9We use this level of aggregation to compare nursing home data with formal home-based care data. As discussed
in Section 1.4, home-based care data are only at provider level.
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compared to people in German speaking regions. This is also confirmed by Figure 1.A.2 where
we show that there are no discontinuities in common diseases among the elderly at the language
border in the three bilingual cantons (see Section 1.6.1 for further details). If ever, mortality rate
is slightly smaller on the Latin side (Figure 1.A.3).
1.5 Empirical strategy
To causally identify the role of culture, we exploit the language divide in bilingual cantons as a
source of exogenous variation within the canton. In particular, we use a spatial RDD contrasting the
dependency levels at entry in nursing homes of individuals living on opposite sides of the linguistic
border (controlling for canton fixed effects). In determining the impact of culture on the demand
for social insurance, Eugster et al. (2011) adopt a fuzzy RDD exploiting the jump in the probability
of speaking French across the two sides of the linguistic border. According to their estimates, the
share of the French speaking population to the West-hand side of the linguistic border is 85%, while
the share of the French speaking population to the East-hand side of the linguistic border is about
10%. In our context, we are not aware of the language spoken by the elderly people in the sample.
Hence, we refer to Eugster et al. (2011) for the first stage estimates of the fuzzy design, and we
only focus on the reduced form.
Following their approach, we define municipalities at the border as those French speaking mu-
nicipalities bordering with at least one German speaking municipality. The municipality of interest
here is the municipality of residence of the elderly person before being institutionalized, not the
municipality of the nursing home. Thus, we define the treatment as a dummy variable equal to 1
if the elderly person resided in the French speaking area before entering the nursing home. The
assignment (or running) variable is the kilometric travel distance from the municipality of residence
to the closest French speaking municipality on the linguistic border. French speaking municipalities
at the linguistic border are assigned a distance of 0 from the border, while all the other French
speaking municipalities are assigned a positive number. In the same way, all the German speaking
municipalities are assigned a negative number.
More specifically, we estimate the following regression:
Yim = β0 + β1Fm + β2distm + β3Zim + β4Fmdistm + εim (1.6)
where Yim is the dependency level at entry of the individual i residing in municipality m (before
entering in the nursing home); Fm is a dummy for French municipalities (our treatment), distm is
the assignment variable, Zim represents a set of covariates and εim is a stochastic error term. The
coefficient β1 represents the effect of interest, namely the difference in dependency levels between
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the French speaking and the German speaking areas at the linguistic border. In the standard
regression discontinuity approach, all the control variables should be continuous at the cut-off,
and thus control variables are not required. However, in the present setting we control for the
canton and the year of entry in nursing homes. Given that LTC policies are set at cantonal level,
controlling for cantons is fundamental to ensure a correct comparison of observations across the
linguistic border. To the same extent, the year of entry is important to avoid capturing time effects
in our average treatment effect. The interaction term between the treatment and the assignment
variable accounts for the possibility of different linear trends on either side of the discontinuity.
The effect of interest and the selection of the optimal bandwidth are both computed using the
non-parametric procedure developed in Calonico et al. (2014) and Calonico et al. (2016).10 The
non-parametric estimator allows to correct for the bias that might arise imposing the linearity of
the fitting line (with robust bias-corrected confidence intervals). The choice of the bandwidth is
based on the optimal bandwidth choice proposed by Imbens and Kakyanaraman (2012). However,
we also test the robustness of our results to the bandwidth choice and to higher polynomial orders
using parametric specifications (see Appendix).
Finally, we evaluate the validity of our identification strategy (i.e., continuity assumption) by
testing for the presence of discontinuity at the border for a very large set of covariates (socio-
demographic and economic variables) and other relevant variables that, by definition, should be
continuous at the border. In particular, we test for discontinuity in the prevalence of the most
common diseases. This is meant to verify whether the discontinuity in the dependency level at entry
in nursing homes is caused by a discontinuous change in the health conditions at the border rather
than different preferences regarding the time of entry in nursing homes, as we argue. Additionally,
we test for discontinuity in prices and other supply factors (i.e., insurance contributions and number
of nursing home beds) that should be also continuous at the border.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Regression discontinuity design
We start the analysis by showing the discontinuity in the dependency level at entry at the linguistic
border (Figure 1.5). We control for canton fixed effect to account for supply and other institutional
differences. Each point in the graph represents the mean residual for a group of municipalities
aggregated according to the distance from the linguistic border in the three bilingual cantons. The
cloud of bins looks noisy because in some municipalities the number of observations (i.e., number
10We use the 2016 version of the Stata command rdrobust.
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of people who entered a nursing home) is quite low. Moreover, using a bandwidth larger than 30
km implies losing at least one canton on each side of the border.11 Therefore, we report the full
bandwidth in the top figure, while in the bottom figure the analysis is restricted to a bandwidth
of 25 km and to municipalities with at least 50 people who entered a nursing home in the period
of interest (2007–2013). In the 25-km figure we observe quite a clear jump in the dependency level
at entry in nursing homes at the linguistic border (predicted also in the full bandwidth figure).
Similarly, Figure 1.6 reports the discontinuity in the share of voters (at municipal level) voting
“yes” in the 2013 referendum on family policies after controlling for canton fixed effect. The large
discontinuity in referendum outcomes at the linguistic border suggests a large discontinuity in
preferences for family policies, which mirrors the differential use of LTC services.
A more formal test of our RDD on the dependency level at entry is presented in Table 1.2.
The optimal bandwidth is computed non-parametrically and the results are obtained controlling
for canton and year fixed effects.12 Column (1) displays the estimates of the treatment effect
(French border) without accounting for the possibility of the linear fitting bias. Columns (2)
and (3) show the estimates of the bias-correction procedure proposed by Calonico et al. (2014)
that accounts for the presence of the linear fitting bias in estimating the average treatment effect.
The average treatment effect is always positive and statistically significant even with robust bias-
corrected confidence intervals (Column (3)). The magnitude of this coefficient accounts for around
10% of the standard deviation. Since our estimates represent a reduced form effect, the coefficient
β1 estimated above should be inflated to take into account the jump in the probability of speaking
French at the linguistic border. According to Eugster et al. (2011), the impact of the treatment
(i.e. residing in the French speaking region) on the language spoken is 0.754. Hence, the average
treatment effect should be multiplied by a factor of 1.327 (1/0.754). In the bias-corrected robust
specification, the inflated average treatment effect is 0.13. This means that accounting for the
actual probability of residing on one side of the linguistic border and speaking the same language,
French speaking people show a 0.13 higher dependency level at entry than German speaking people,
which is 13% of the standard deviation. In addition, recalling that each point in our measurement
scale of the dependency level corresponds to one hour of care per day, a French-German gap of
0.13 corresponds to 6 more minutes of care per day at entry in the French speaking part. To give
11Note that the full bandwidth is not symmetric because the German side spans for almost 150 km, while the
French one for less than 80.
12As a robustness check, we report the results without controlling for canton and year fixed effects in Table 1.A.1
of Appendix. The magnitude of the coefficient β1 is almost 4 times larger than the main estimates. This result
might be due to canton-specific factors correlated with the language. For instance, some cultural differences may be
captured by the canton fixed effect since the three bilingual cantons have a different proportion of German-speaking
people (Bern 84%, Friburg 33%, and Valais 29%). In any case, this result confirms the importance of controlling for
institutional differences across cantons to disentangle the cultural variation.
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a grasp about the magnitude of this effect, 6 minutes per day corresponds to 36.5 hours of care in
one year per elderly person in nursing home.
Robustness checks
To check the validity of our non-parametric estimates, we perform a parametric RDD evaluating the
sensitivity of the estimated coefficients to different bandwidths (namely 25-km, 50-km and 100-km)
and different polynomial orders (up to fourth). The results reported in Table 1.A.2 of Appendix
are consistent with those reported in the main text.
We also repeat our non-parametric estimations with two more dependent variables: age at entry
(Age at entry) and residing at home prior to nursing home entry (Residing at home). The regression
discontinuity results for these two variables are presented in Table 1.A.3 of Appendix. The point
estimate on Age at entry is always positive, even though the large standard errors wipe out the
significance of the coefficients. This confirms our previous insights, according to which French
speaking individuals tend to enter nursing homes at older ages, but this measure is too noisy to find
any conclusive evidence. For Residing at home the estimated discontinuity at the language border
is always negative and statistically significant. This suggests that German speaking individuals
enter a nursing home from their home more often than French speaking individuals. This supports
our idea of a cultural divide between the two areas. Indeed, people in the French speaking region
are more likely to enter a nursing home from hospital or another institution, that is when critical
health conditions do not allow to postpone entry anymore.
Continuity assumption
As previously mentioned, control variables and other potential determinants of entrance in a nursing
home should be continuous at the cut-off. For this reason, in the Appendix we provide graphical
evidence of the continuity of a very large set of variables. In particular, we do not observe evidence
of a discontinuity at the linguistic border in gender, mortality rate, share of people 65+, population,
home ownership, taxable income, and education (Figures 1.A.3 and 1.A.4). This also allows us to
discard some of the most plausible explanations for the observed discontinuity in the dependency
level at the linguistic border. Conversely, we do find a discontinuity in the immigration rate and,
if we consider a bandwidth larger than 25 km, in the unemployment rate. The close proximity to
France explains the higher immigration rate on the French side of the three bilingual cantons. We
believe that such discontinuity is not a concern for our identification because we already showed
large differences among natives (almost all people in nursing home) in preferences and family values.
Regarding the unemployment rate, the relatively large difference between the two language groups
fades away as we get closer to the language border. Nevertheless, the estimated discontinuity in
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the dependency level is not affected when we include these variables as controls in our RDD (Table
1.A.4).
Finally, we use two additional levels of aggregation to further test our main identification as-
sumption. First, we exploit the distance between the municipality of the provider headquarter
and the linguistic border to show that there are no discontinuities in clients out-of-pocket expendi-
ture for LTC services, in private insurance contributions and in the number of nursing home beds
(Figure 1.A.5). This result is not surprising because we are holding constant the supply factors
at cantonal level. Then, we use administrative data at hospital level to test for the presence of
discontinuity in diseases (Figure 1.A.2). In particular, we do not find evidence of discontinuities
in acute myocardial infarction, hip fractures, strokes, and Parkinson disease, which are frequent
among the elderly and likely to affect LTC arrangement decisions.13
1.6.2 Mechanisms and alternative explanations
The large battery of tests on the continuity assumption (Figures 1.A.2–1.A.5) allows us to reject sev-
eral plausible explanations for the discontinuity in the dependency level at the language border. In
particular, we show that demographic, socio-economics aspects (demand side), supply-side factors
and health conditions are continuous at the language border. Furthermore, following the literature
on the determinants of LTC choices we find no evidence of discontinuity in home ownership.
Clearly, most of the evidence reported so far comes from aggregate data at municipal level and
does not allow to investigate other household characteristics that affect LTC choices and to focus
on households with elderly people. For this reason, in Table 1.3, we investigate whether there are
differences between the two language groups in several household characteristics. We use census
data (PUS) and focus only on the three bilingual cantons. Although differences in family values
could affect the household structure, we do not find evidence of large differences in the household
size between the two linguistic groups, both unconditional (Column (1)) and conditional on respon-
dents 65+ (Column (2)). Moreover, focusing only on 65+ respondents we do not find differences in
the probability of living alone (Column (3)) or with a partner (Column (4)). Finally, in Column (5)
we show that there are no differences in the probability of living with parents for adult respondents
(aged 30–64).
Family value and informal care
We already documented large differences in family values between the two cultural groups in Fig-
13We also investigate other diseases but their prevalence does not allow to provide a meaningful test of the continuity
at the linguistic border.
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ure 1.1. Also, the figure suggests that Latin speaking individuals consider elderly care a family
duty and spend more time taking care of other family members. Furthermore, political preferences
(i.e. referendum votes) on family policies are strongly correlated with the language. Finally, using
data from the Swiss Household Panel we find that Latin respondents declare to have more frequent
contacts with both children and relatives than German respondents (see Table 1.A.5).14 This sup-
ports the interpretation that the language spoken captures the cultural variation in preferences
about the family.
We argue that these differences in family values and ties explain why people from Latin speaking
areas enter a nursing home in worse health conditions than their German neighbors. Strong family
ties may lead people to postpone entrance in nursing home because people prefer to stay with their
family members as long as possible. However, home care arrangements require that medical and
personal care is carried out at home with formal or informal care services. We already showed that
in Latin speaking districts there is a larger use of home care services (Figure 1.4). Moreover, we
expect that informal care is also more widespread in Latin speaking regions because help at home
for ADL and IADL is generally not covered by health insurance. Unfortunately, we do not have
data on informal care that allow us to show evidence of discontinuity at the language border in
the provision of informal care. Despite this, we can take advantage of survey data from SHARE
focusing on the two Swiss NUTS2 regions that include our bilingual areas.15
Table 1.4 shows that Latin speaking respondents living in these two regions receive and provide
more informal care than their German counterpart. In particular, Latin respondents receive more
care from both household members and relatives outside the household, and they also provide
more care to other family members or to grandchildren. This difference is robust to the inclusion
of potential confounders such as age, sex, education and area characteristics (rural vs. urban). By
comparing the results of Table 1.3 and 1.4, it is interesting to note that individuals speaking a Latin
language provide more informal care, even though the household size is not statistically different
between the two areas (if ever, it is smaller in the French speaking area). This evidence further
corroborates our argument that observed differences in LTC arrangement choices between the two
cultural areas should be driven by different family values.
14More details regarding Swiss Household Panel data are provided in the Appendix (see the notes of Table 1.A.5).
15For consistency with our main analysis, we only use data from respondents living in the bilingual NUTS2 regions:
CH01 (Vaud, Valais, and Geneva) and CH02 (Berne, Fribourg, Solothurn, Neuchatel, Jura). The Nomenclature of
Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) is a standard geocode for referencing the subdivision of countries for statistical
purposes.
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1.7 Discussion
This paper investigates the role of culture in shaping LTC arrangement decisions. We use data from
Switzerland, a multi-cultural confederation of 26 states and four languages, where the two main
linguistic groups —Latin and German— are characterized by large differences in family values and
opinions about the role of family in taking care of the elderly.
To identify the impact of culture, we perform a spatial RDD at the linguistic border of the
three French and German speaking bilingual cantons. We find that people residing in the French
speaking part of the country enter a nursing home with higher dependency level as compared to
people residing in the German speaking areas. Adopting different parametric and non-parametric
specifications, we find that the French-German gap in the dependency levels at entry corresponds
to 6 more minutes of care per day in the French speaking areas (i.e., 36.5 more hours of care in a
year per elderly person in nursing home), and accounts for roughly 13% of the standard deviation.
The reported evidence of a strong (causal) influence of culture on the Swiss LTC market may
also contribute to explain the large cross-country variation in the size of LTC markets. This is
particularly relevant for Europe, where cultural differences about the role of family show a clear
North-South gradient.
Our findings may have important policy implications. Public policies that incentivize specific
LTC arrangements may lead to different behavioral responses in the population according to pre-
dominant preferences. In other words, increasing the provision of specific elderly care arrangements
without a careful evaluation of the demand-side response may not be sufficient to expand their use.
For example, in Switzerland between 27% and 56% of days spent in nursing homes in 2013 involved
people with very low need of care. Notably, experts argue that people receiving between one and
two hours of daily care could be cared more efficiently with formal home-based services than in
nursing homes (Wa¨chter and Ku¨nzi, 2011). However, given their stronger preferences for nursing
home care, German speaking individuals with mild health problems may still be better off entering
a nursing home, even though it would be more cost-effective from the society viewpoint to grant
them care at home. Therefore, expanding formal home-based care provision in German speaking
areas may not trigger an increase in home-based care use per se.
Finally, our results suggest that the availability of substitutes for elderly care may be endogenous
to culture. Many empirical studies investigating the substitutability between formal and informal
services use the presence of other people in the household or the presence of children living within
a certain distance from the household as an instrument for the provision of informal care. However,
French speaking individuals provide more informal care even in the absence of systematic differences
28
in household size. This suggests that the availability of substitutes for formal care per se does not
trigger the provision of informal care.
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Figure 1.1: Cultural attitudes in Latin and German speaking areas towards family and elderly care
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Notes - Sources: These figures are based on data from the 2008 Swiss sample of the European Value Survey (EVS) and from the
2012 Swiss sample of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The EVS includes 1’238 respondents (937 Germans
+ 301 Latins), while the ISSP includes 1’198 respondents (892 Germans + 306 Latins). Each graph shows the Latin-German
gap after conditioning on age (full set of age dummies), sex and education. Top-left: EVS - Question 2: “How important is the
family in your life?”; Top-right: ISSP - Question 14: “Thinking about elderly people who need some help in their everyday lives,
such as help with grocery shopping, cleaning the house, doing the laundry etc. Who do you think should primarily provide this
help?”; Bottom-left: EVS - Question 51a: “Which of the following statements best describes your views about responsibilities
of adult children towards their parents when their parents are in need of long-term care? Adult children have the duty to
provide long-term care for their parents even at the expense of their own well-being.”; Bottom-right: ISSP - Question 16b:
“On average, how many hours a week do you spend looking after family members? (e.g. children, elderly, ill or disabled family
members?)”. Results are substantially unchanged even conditional on standard demographic and socio-economic controls (i.e.,
age, sex, education, employment status).
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Figure 1.2: Linguistic areas across Switzerland
Notes - Colors correspond to different linguistic areas. In order from the darkest color to the lightest color: French speaking
area, German speaking area, Italian speaking area, and Romansh speaking area. Dark lines correspond to cantonal borders
while white lines highlight linguistic borders that do not coincide with cantonal borders. Cantonal labels are reported only for
bilingual and trilingual cantons and correspond to: BE - Bern; FR - Fribourg; GR - Graubu¨nden; VS - Valais.
Sources: Base maps: c©OFS, ThemaKart.
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Figure 1.3: Relationship between dependency level and preference parameter for home-based care
Notes - Graph drawn according to the functional form ph(d) = α+ βd, where α can be interpreted as the fixed component of
home-based care price with respect to the severity of the elderly person health condition, and β can be interpreted as the variable
component of home-based care price with respect to the severity of the elderly person health condition. Then, d∗ = δ(pn+α)−α
(1−δ)β .
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Figure 1.4: Dependency level at entry and share of people over 65 in formal home-based care by
district and linguistic area in 2013
Notes - The map reports the average dependency level at entry in nursing home (top) and the average number of hours of
home-based care per person aged 65 or more (bottom) by district in 2013. Intervals depicted in different colors correspond to
the terciles of average hours of formal home-based care (per capita) by district. Black borders delimit linguistic areas: FRE -
French, GER - German, ITA - Italian, ROM - Romansh.
Sources: Base maps: c©OFS, ThemaKart; Data: SOMED and HCS - year 2013.
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of dependency level at entry across the linguistic border
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Notes - This graph is based on individual data from the three bilingual cantons of Berne, Fribourg and Valais for the period
2007-2013, and is adjusted for cantonal and year fixed effect. The top graph includes all people from all municipalities, while the
bottom graph includes only people that used to live within 25 km (travel distance) from the language border. The number of bins
is automatically computed by the cmogram command of Stata 14 and corresponds to #bins = min{sqrt(N), 10∗ln(N)/ln(10)},
where N is the (weighted) number of observations. We exclude from the figure extreme values (top and bottom 1% of the
dependency level distribution) and individuals from municipalities with less than 50 observations. Positive values on the x-
axis correspond to the kilometric travel distance from the closest French speaking municipality on the linguistic border for
French speaking municipalities. Negative values on the x-axis correspond to the kilometric travel distance from the closest
French speaking municipality on the linguistic border for German speaking municipalities. French speaking municipalities at
the linguistic border are assigned a distance of 0 from the linguistic border.
Sources: Elaboration on SOMED data - years 2007-2013.
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Figure 1.6: Distribution of preferences for family policies across the linguistic border - 2013 refer-
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Notes - The referendum was about the approval of an amendment to the Swiss Constitution committing the cantons to provide
complementary day care facilities to help the reconciliation between work and family duties, and allowing the Confederation
to intervene whenever cantonal efforts are insufficient. This graph is based on municipal data from the three bilingual cantons
of Berne, Fribourg and Valais, and is adjusted for cantonal fixed effect. The top graph includes all the municipalities, while
the bottom graph includes only municipalities within 25 km (travel distance) from the language border. The number of bins is
automatically computed by the cmogram command of Stata 14 and corresponds to #bins = min{sqrt(N), 10 ∗ ln(N)/ln(10)},
where N is the (weighted) number of observations. Positive values on the x-axis correspond to the kilometric travel distance
from the closest French speaking municipality on the linguistic border for French speaking municipalities. Negative values on
the x-axis correspond to the kilometric travel distance from the closest French speaking municipality on the linguistic border
for German speaking municipalities. French speaking municipalities at the linguistic border are assigned a distance of 0 from
the linguistic border.
Sources: Elaboration on Swiss Federal Statistical Office data - year 2013.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics: individual level data in the three bilingual cantons
French German t-test
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D. P-value
Dependency level at entry 10,189 2.58 1.01 31,413 1.93 .95 0.000***
Age at entry 10,189 83.93 7.94 31,413 83.85 8.25 0.505
Gender 10,189 .33 .47 31,413 .34 .47 0.311
Residing at home 9,965 .33 .47 30,619 .57 .50 0.000***
Notes - Dependency level at entry is measured on a scale from 0 to 4, Age at entry is a discrete variable from 50 onwards,
Gender is a dummy variable equal to 1 for men, and Residing at home is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the elderly
person was residing at home prior to institutionalization, and 0 if he/she entered the nursing home from a hospital or from
another institution. All these variables are drawn from SOMED. The data refer to the cantons of Berne, Fribourg and Valais
for the period 2007-2013 and are reported at individual level. The number of observations for Residing at home is lower
because of missing values. P-value refers to a t-test for mean comparison between French speaking and German speaking
individuals. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors are robust and clustered at municipal level.
Table 1.2: Non-parametric Regression Discontinuity Design
Conventional Bias-corrected Robust
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Dependency level at entry
French border (β1) .106*** .103*** .103**
(.04) (.04) (.05)
Observations on the East 5,400 5,400 5,400
Observations on the West 5,828 5,828 5,828
Bandwidth 19.91 19.91 19.91
Mean of dependent variable 2.34 2.34 2.34
Std. dev. of dependent variable 1.02 1.02 1.02
Canton fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes - All the estimates are based on individual level data from the three bilingual French and German speaking cantons of
Berne, Fribourg and Valais for the period 2007-2013. The dependent variable Dependency level at entry is measured on a 0-4
scale. The assignment variable is the kilometric travel distance from the closest French speaking municipality on the linguistic
border. Controls include year of entry and canton of residence prior to institutionalization. The number of observations refer
to the number of individuals respectively on the East and on the West of the linguistic border. The number of municipalities
on the East of the linguistic border is 80 while the number of municipalities on the West is 107. In Figure 1.A.6 in Appendix
we also show the distribution of municipalities across the linguistic border. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust and clustered at municipal level. Estimates are performed using the Stata
command rdrobust.
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Table 1.3: Household composition (PUS 2000)
Dep. variable: Hh. size Hh. size Single Partner Parents
Sample: All 65+ 65+ 65+ 30–64
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Latin language -.073* -.124 .007 .001 -.005
(.038) (.143) (.012) (.012) (.003)
Observations 62,348 11,230 11,230 11,230 29,446
Notes - Data are drawn from Public use sample (PUS) of the 2000 Swiss census. We only include Swiss respondents from the
three bilingual cantons of Berne, Fribourg and Valais. Each column reports the results of different regressions of Latin language
on different variables and samples: (1) household size – the full sample; (2) Household size – 65+ sample; (3) Single household
– 65+ sample; (4) living with a partner – 65+ sample; (5) Living with parents in the household – 30–64 sample. Latin language
is a dummy for the language of the interview, i.e. whether the questionnaire was completed in French (Latin) or German. Each
regression also controls for age, sex, canton fixed effects and a dummy for rural areas. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Table 1.4: Language and informal care in bilingual regions (SHARE data)
Care from Care from Care to Looking after
hh. members family (no hh.) hh. members grandchildren
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Latin language .016* .071** .125*** .133***
(.010) (.026) (.035) (.048)
Observations 891 752 752 365
Notes - Data are from wave 4 of SHARE. We only include Swiss respondents aged 50+ from the NUTS2 regions: CH01 (Vaud,
Valais, and Geneva) and CH02 (Berne, Fribourg, Solothurn, Neuchaˆtel, Jura). Each column reports the result from probit
regressions of Latin language on four different dummy variables: (1) the respondent received care from household members;
(2) the respondent received care from family members outsides the household; (3) the respondent provided care to household
members; (4) the respondent looked after grandchildren. Latin language is a dummy for the language of the interview, i.e.
whether the questionnaire was completed in French (Latin) or German. Each regression also controls for age (quadratic), sex,
education (5 dummies) and a dummy for rural areas. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors
(in parenthesis) are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Appendix
1.A Appendix (for online publication)
1.A.1 Measuring the dependency level at entry
The measurement instruments adopted to evaluate the dependency level of elderly people in nursing
homes vary within and between cantons and over time. In particular, there are three instruments.
The PLAISIR is mainly adopted in French-speaking cantons and reflects the intensity of care re-
quired by elderly people. Conversely, the other two instruments, BESA and RAI-RUG, reflect the
intensity of care actually provided to elderly people. Since care requirements may not correspond to
the level of care actually provided, the PLAISIR instrument may slightly overestimate the depen-
dency level of elderly people at entry. Therefore, a harmonization of the instruments is necessary.
In 2011 an instrument harmonization effort was made by the Swiss assembly of cantonal health
care department directors. Thus, a uniform measurement instrument is in place since 2011. Using
the suggested conversion procedure we harmonize the intensity of care from different instruments
adopted before 2011. Moreover, there are two versions of the BESA instrument: the first one uses
a scale from 0 to 12, and each level of the scale corresponds to 20 minutes of daily care; the second
one ranges from 0 to 4, and each level of the scale corresponds to 1 hour of daily care. Therefore,
we collapse all the scale values into a broader measurement scale, ranging from 0 to 4.
Following the harmonization of measurement instruments and scales, we assess the dependency
level at entry for each nursing home resident. We focus on the initial event of care received after
entry. We also perform a robustness check using the most intensive event of care received during
the year of entry rather than the very first care, and obtain the same results.
Several nursing home residents show repeated entry-exit spells in the period considered, either
in the same nursing home or in different nursing homes (around 4% of individuals). Therefore,
to consider the most correct entry date, we exclude temporary residents.16 Also, we deal with
repeated spells applying a simple algorithm. We keep the first entry date if the individual does not
16Nursing homes may host temporary patients needing a rehabilitation period after hospitalization or elderly people
joining daily activities who are not actually residing in the nursing home.
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go back home for more than 6 months. This means that for individuals admitted to hospital after
institutionalization and then re-entered the nursing home, we consider the first entry date as the
actual entry date. Conversely, for individuals who go back home for more than 6 months before
entering again, we exclude the first spell and we apply the same criterion to the second entry date.
For individuals who go back home for more than 6 months even after the second spell, we also
exclude the second spell and apply the same criterion to the third spell, and so on. Of course, for
individuals who stay for more than one year and then go back home for more than 6 months before
entering again, we keep the first entry date.
Finally, we consider that the provision of care may not have started immediately after the date
of entry in a nursing home. Since our data only report the ending date of care, people entering a
nursing home in the last part of the year may be disproportionately likely to show no care received
in the year of entry. To avoid wrong imputation, for elderly people who enter a nursing home
between October and December and do not show any care event until the end of the year, we
consider the first care event received in the second year.
1.A.2 Description of variables
Individual level data (from SOMED)
Dependency level: Discrete variable ranging from 0 to 4. 0 corresponds to no care required and
each additional unit corresponds to one hour of daily care. A dependency level of 4 corresponds to
4 or more hours of care per day.
Age at entry: Discrete variable. Only clients entering the nursing home at 50 years old or more
are included in the sample.
Gender: Dummy variable equal to 1 for men.
Residing at home: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the elderly person resided at home before
entering a nursing home and equal to 0 if the elderly person was in a hospital or in another
institution.
Municipal level data (sources in parenthesis)17
Referendum (% ‘yes’) (FSO): Share of people voting ‘yes’ to the 2013 referendum on family
policies. The referendum was about the approval of an amendment to the Swiss Constitution com-
mitting the cantons to provide complementary day care facilities to help the reconciliation between
17FSO stands for Federal Statistical Office; FTA stands for Federal Tax Administration.
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work and family duties, and allowing the Confederation to intervene whenever cantonal efforts are
insufficient.
Mortality rate (FSO): Number of deaths per municipality out of municipal population.
Share of people above 65 (FSO): Share of people above 65 years old out of municipal popu-
lation. Since population data by age are not available before 2010, we project the share of elderly
people in 2010 on the population between 2007 and 2009.
Population (FSO): Number of municipal residents.
Immigration rate (FSO): Number of foreign residents out of municipal population.
Birth rate (FSO): Number of new births out of municipal population.
Home ownership rate (FSO): Share of people owning their dwelling by municipality.
Unemployment rate: Share of unemployed out of municipal population. Since unemployment
data could not be disaggregated at municipal level for municipalities that underwent a merger be-
fore 2016, this variable is only available for 2016.
Taxable income (FTA): Logarithm of per capita municipal income.
Share tertiary education (FSO): Share of municipal residents with tertiary education.
Altitude (FSO): Average between the minimum and the maximum elevation of the municipality.
Religion (FSO): Share of catholics out of total municipal population.
Provider level data (sources in parenthesis)
Nursing homes - client out-of-pocket (SOMED): Client out-of-pocket expenditure by nursing
home divided by the number of nursing home clients. Before 2011 this variable was not available.
Share over 65 in nursing home (SOMED): Number of people above 65 years old residing in
a nursing home out of population above 65 years old residing in the district.
Home care - client out-of-pocket (HCS): Client out-of-pocket expenditure by provider divided
by the provider number of clients. Before 2011 this variable was not available.
Home-care hours (HCS): Number of hours of formal home-based care provided by district out
of population above 65 years old residing in the district.
LTC insurance contribution (SOMED and HCS): Sum of insurance contributions for nursing
home and home-based care divided by the sum of nursing home and home care clients. Before 2011
this variable was not available.
Nursing homes - number of beds (SOMED): Number of beds for long stayers in nursing
homes.
41
MEDSTAT level data (hospital admission data)18
Incidence of AMI (Acute Miocardial Infarction): Number of hospital admissions for AMI
out of medstat population.
Incidence of hip fractures: Number of hospital admissions for hip fracture out of medstat
population.
Incidence of strokes: Number of hospital admissions for stroke out of medstat population.
Incidence of Parkinson disease: Number of hospital admissions for Parkinson disease out of
medstat population.
18Medstats are geographical units defined according to postal codes. Since we only have population at municipal
level, whenever a municipality overlaps several medstats we assign an equal share of municipal population to all the
medstats involved.
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Figure 1.A.1: Percentage of people over 65 in nursing homes by district and linguistic area in 2013
Notes - The percentage of people in nursing homes is computed dividing the number of people above 65 years old residing
in a nursing home by the number of people above 65 years old residing in the district. Intervals depicted in different colors
correspond to the terciles of the percentage of people above 65 residing in a nursing home by district. Black borders delimit
linguistic areas: FRE - French, GER - German, ITA - Italian, ROM - Romansh.
Sources: Base maps: c©OFS, ThemaKart; Data: SOMED - year 2013.
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Figure 1.A.2: Distribution of diseases across the linguistic border (hospital admission data)
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Notes - The graphs are based on provider-level data from the three bilingual cantons of Berne, Fribourg and Valais for the
period 2007-2012, and are adjusted for cantonal fixed effects. For hospital data the unit of observation is the medical statistical
unit (medstat), which is defined in terms of postal codes. We derive the distance of each medstat from the linguistic border
averaging the distances of the municipalities within the medstat. The number of bins is set manually to 15 on each side of
the discontinuity, and the graph is performed using the Stata command cmogram. Positive values on the x-axis correspond
to the kilometric travel distance from the closest French speaking municipality on the linguistic border for French speaking
municipalities. Negative values on the x-axis correspond to the kilometric travel distance from the closest French speaking
municipality on the linguistic border for German speaking municipalities. French speaking municipalities at the linguistic
border are assigned a distance of 0 from the linguistic border. The number of cases is normalized according to each medstat
population.
Sources: Elaboration on hospital admission data - years 2007-2012.
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Figure 1.A.3: Distribution of demographic variables across the linguistic border (individual or
municipal level)
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Notes - The graph for gender (top-left) is based on SOMED individual data for the three bilingual cantons of Berne, Fribourg
and Valais for the period 2007-2013, and is adjusted for cantonal and year fixed effects. The other graphs are based on
municipal data from the three bilingual cantons of Berne, Fribourg and Valais for the period 2007-2013, and are adjusted for
cantonal fixed effects. The number of bins is automatically computed by the cmogram command of Stata 14 and corresponds
to #bins = min{sqrt(N), 10 ∗ ln(N)/ln(10)}, where N is the (weighted) number of observations. Positive values on the x-
axis correspond to the kilometric travel distance from the closest French speaking municipality on the linguistic border for
French speaking municipalities. Negative values on the x-axis correspond to the kilometric travel distance from the closest
French speaking municipality on the linguistic border for German speaking municipalities. French speaking municipalities at
the linguistic border are assigned a distance of 0 from the linguistic border.
Sources: Elaboration on SOMED and Swiss Federal Statistical Office data - years 2007-2013.
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Figure 1.A.4: Distribution of socio-economic variables across the linguistic border (municipal level)
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Notes - The graphs are based on municipal data from the three bilingual cantons of Berne, Fribourg and Valais for the period
2007-2013, and are adjusted for cantonal fixed effects. Income data are only available up to 2012, while unemployment data are
only available for 2016. The number of bins is automatically computed by the cmogram command of Stata 14 and corresponds
to #bins = min{sqrt(N), 10 ∗ ln(N)/ln(10)}, where N is the (weighted) number of observations. Positive values on the x-
axis correspond to the kilometric travel distance from the closest French speaking municipality on the linguistic border for
French speaking municipalities. Negative values on the x-axis correspond to the kilometric travel distance from the closest
French speaking municipality on the linguistic border for German speaking municipalities. French speaking municipalities at
the linguistic border are assigned a distance of 0 from the linguistic border.
Sources: Elaboration on Swiss Federal Statistical Office data and Federal Tax Administration data - years 2007-2013.
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Figure 1.A.5: Distribution of supply-side variables across the linguistic border (provider level)
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Notes - The graphs are based on provider-level data from the three bilingual cantons of Berne, Fribourg and Valais, and
are adjusted for cantonal fixed effects. Data about client out-of-pocket expenditure and private insurance contributions are
only available since 2011. The graph about the number of beds is based on the whole period, 2007-2013. The graph about
home care client out-of-pocket expenditure is based on the cantons of Berne and Valais, since this value was 0 for all the
providers in Fribourg. Figures for client out-of-pocket expenditure and private insurance contributions only refer to medical
care costs. Residential costs or ADL and IADL costs are not included. Each provider is assigned a kilometric distance from
the linguistic border according to the municipality of its headquarter. The number of bins is set manually to 15 on each side
of the discontinuity and the graph is performed using the Stata command cmogram. Positive values on the x-axis correspond
to the kilometric travel distance from the closest French speaking municipality on the linguistic border for French speaking
municipalities. Negative values on the x-axis correspond to the kilometric travel distance from the closest French speaking
municipality on the linguistic border for German speaking municipalities. French speaking municipalities at the linguistic
border are assigned a distance of 0 from the linguistic border.
Sources: Elaboration on SOMED and HCS data - years 2007-2013.
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Figure 1.A.6: Distribution of municipalities across the linguistic border
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Notes - This graph represents the number of municipalities according to the kilometric travel distance from the linguistic border.
Each bar corresponds to a 5-km bandwidth.
Sources: Elaboration on FSO data.
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Table 1.A.1: Non-parametric Regression Discontinuity Design without controls
Conventional Bias-corrected Robust
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Dependency level at entry
French border (β1) .389*** .419*** .419***
(.09) (.09) (.11)
Observations on the East 3,704 3,704 3,704
Observations on the West 3,484 3,484 3,484
Bandwidth 10.22 10.22 10.22
Mean of dependent variable 2.29 2.29 2.29
Std. dev. of dependent variable 1.02 1.02 1.02
Canton fixed effects No No No
Year fixed effects No No No
Notes - All the estimates are based on individual level data from the three bilingual French and German speaking cantons
of Berne, Fribourg and Valais for the period 2007-2013. The dependent variable Dependency level at entry is measured on
a 0-4 scale. The assignment variable is the kilometric travel distance from the closest French speaking municipality on the
linguistic border. Estimates are performed using the Stata command rdrobust. Observations refer to the number of individuals.
Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust and clustered at municipal
level.
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Table 1.A.2: Parametric Regression Discontinuity Design
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependency level at entry
French border (β1) .123** .094* .141*** .106** .016 .154**
(0.05) (.05) (.04) (.05) (.06) (.06)
Observations 12,780 27,499 39,988 39,988 39,988 39,988
Dep. var. mean 2.33 2.16 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.10
Dep. var. std. dev. 1.02 1.03 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
Bandwidth: 25 km 50 km 100 km 100 km 100 km 100 km
Polynomial fit: Linear Linear Linear Quadratic Cubic Quartic
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes - All the estimates are based on individual level data from the three bilingual French and German speaking cantons of
Berne, Fribourg and Valais for the period 2007-2013. The dependent variable Dependency level at entry is measured on a 0-4
scale. The assignment variable is the kilometric travel distance from the closest French speaking municipality on the linguistic
border. Estimates are performed using the Stata command rdrobust. Observations refer to the number of individuals. Control
variables are year of entry and canton of residence prior to institutionalization. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust and clustered at municipal level.
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Table 1.A.3: Non-parametric Regression Discontinuity Design with other dependent variables
Conventional Bias-corrected Robust
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Residing at home
French border (β1) -.075*** -.065*** -.065***
(.02) (.02) (.02)
Observations on the left 5,149 5,149 5,149
Observations on the right 4,595 4,595 4,595
Bandwidth 17.25 17.25 17.25
Mean of dependent variable .43 .43 .43
Std. dev. of dependent variable .50 .50 .50
Age at entry
French border (β1) .591 .728 .728
(.50) (.50) (.62)
Observations on the left 4,519 4,519 4,519
Observations on the right 4,276 4,276 4,276
Bandwidth 13.87 13.87 13.87
Mean of dependent variable 83.80 83.80 83.80
Std. dev. of dependent variable 8.05 8.05 8.05
Canton fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes - All the estimates are based on individual level data from the three bilingual French and German speaking cantons
of Berne, Fribourg and Valais for the period 2007-2013. The dependent variable Residing at home is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the elderly person was residing at home prior to institutionalization, and 0 if he/she entered the nursing home from
a hospital or from another institution. The dependent variable Age at entry is a discrete variable from 50 onwards. The
assignment variable is the kilometric travel distance from the closest French speaking municipality on the linguistic border.
Controls include year of entry and canton of residence prior to institutionalization. Estimates are performed using the Stata
command rdrobust. Observations refer to the number of individuals. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust and clustered at municipal level.
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Table 1.A.4: Regression Discontinuity Design with additional controls (non-parametric and para-
metric)
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non-parametric RDD (Conventional)
French border (β1) .092** .109*** .113*** .110*** .104*** .098***
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Observations on the East 5,400 5,309 5,461 5,433 5,433 5,400
Observations on the West 5,868 5,030 5,951 5,899 5,933 5,868
Bandwidth 20.06 18.17 20.73 20.40 20.58 20.14
Mean of dependent variable 2.34 2.32 2.34 2.34 2.34 2.34
Std. dev. of dependent variable 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
Parametric RDD (25-km bandwidth)
French border (β1) .121*** .124*** .127*** .121** .123*** .120***
(.04) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.04)
Observations 12,780 12,780 12,780 12,780 12,780 12,780
Mean of dependent variable 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33
Std. dev. of dependent variable 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
Canton fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Immigration rate Yes No No No No Yes
Birth rate No Yes No No No Yes
Gender No No Yes No No Yes
Municipal altitude No No No Yes No Yes
Religion No No No No Yes Yes
Notes - All the estimates are based on individual level data from the three bilingual French and German speaking cantons of
Berne, Fribourg and Valais for the period 2007-2013. The dependent variable Dependency level at entry is measured on a 0-4
scale. The assignment variable is the kilometric travel distance from the closest French speaking municipality on the linguistic
border. Controls include year of entry, canton of residence prior to institutionalization, and some additional controls according
to the specification adopted. The additional controls included are the municipal immigration rate, Immigration rate, birth
rate, Birth rate, altitude, Municipal altitude, share of catholics, Religion, and/or a dummy variable for gender equal to 1 for
males, Gender. The upper part of the table reports the conventional non-parametric RDD estimates computed with the Stata
command rdrobust. The bottom part of the table reports the parametric RDD esitmates adopting a 25-km bandwidth and a
linear polynomial specification. Observations refer to the number of individuals. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust and clustered at municipal level.
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Table 1.A.5: Estimated Latin language effects on contacts with children and relatives (logit regres-
sions, only individuals aged 60+)
No. of contacts with children No. of contacts with relatives
Column (1) (2) (3) (4)
At least once .013 -.007 .143*** .066***
a week (.01) (.02) (.02) (.02)
At least twice .105*** .156*** .062***
a week (.02) (.03) (.02) (.02)
At least three .146*** .052** .106*** .047***
times a week (.02) (.03) (.02) (.02)
Observations 2,632 2,632 3,077 3,077
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Notes - Data are drawn from waves 1 to 12 of the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), a yearly panel study administered by the
Swiss Federal Statistical Office. More information on this dataset is available at: http://forscenter.ch/en/our-surveys/swiss-
household-panel/documentationfaq-2/. This table shows the coefficients of a Latin language dummy variable (equal to 1 if the
individual speaks either French, Italian or Romansh or 0 if he/she speaks German) on the probability of having contacts with
children (Columns 1 and 2) or relatives (Columns 3 and 4) at least once, twice, or three times a week. Particularly, the SHP
relevant variables to compute the number of contacts are “P$$N08 - How frequent are your contacts with children? (times per
month)” and “P$$N13 - How frequent are your contacts with relatives? (times per month)”. The reported coefficients are the
marginal effects of logistic regressions. Demographic variables include sex and age. Observations only include individuals aged
60+ residing in the cantons of Berne, Fribourg and Valais. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Source: Swiss Household Panel - years 1999-2010.
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Chapter 2
What drives the substitutability
between native and foreign workers?
Evidence about the role of language
2.1 Introduction
There is an extensive literature about the impact of migrant workers on native wages and em-
ployment opportunities.1 A key element of the discussion is the degree of substitutability between
foreign and native workers. On the one hand, if foreign workers are perfect substitutes for native
workers, migration inflows should negatively affect native wages because they simply increase the
labor force of the destination country (Borjas, 2003; Borjas and Katz, 2007). On the other hand,
if foreign workers are imperfect substitutes for native workers, they might specialize in different
occupations and improve the efficiency of the labor market, with little effect on native wages. In
the classic nested-cell approach derived by Borjas (2003), the national labor force is subdivided
into education-experience cells. Migration is treated as a pure supply shock and the different stock
of migrants by cell provides the necessary variation to identify the impact of an increase in labor
supply on native wages.2 Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Manacorda et al. (2012) further extend
this model to account for the imperfect substitutability in production of native and foreign workers
within the same education-experience group. They find evidence of imperfect substitutability and
argue that native and immigrant workers with similar observable characteristics (i.e., education
and experience) may still have different comparative advantages in the labor market.
One potential determinant of the imperfect substitutability between foreign and native workers
may be the proficiency in the language spoken in the destination country. As shown by Peri and
1See Dustmann et al. (2016) and Peri (2016) for a critical review of the literature.
2Within this framework, the impact of migration on productivity is neglected. As a result, this analysis may not
account for part of the positive effect of migration on the wages of native workers.
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Sparber (2009), new migration inflows induce native workers to move from physically demanding
jobs to more communicatively intensive jobs. Intuitively, this job specialization process of natives
and foreigners in manual and language intensive tasks may be driven by differences in the language
proficiency of these two groups of workers and indeed, low levels of language proficiency are associ-
ated with worse wage trajectories for migrants (see Dustmann and Fabbri, 2003 and Chiswick and
Miller, 2014 for a review). Nevertheless, there might be several other unobservable characteristics
(e.g., preferences or willingness to work in manual jobs) that could make immigrants and natives
somewhat complementary in the production function.
In this paper, we exploit the peculiarity of the Swiss labor market to shed light on the role of
language in driving the imperfect substitutability between native and foreign workers. Switzerland
is a multi-lingual country with four official languages spoken, three of which in common with
bordering countries (German, French and Italian). Starting from the ’50s Switzerland experienced
several immigration waves from different countries and even today its foreign-born population is
one of the largest among OECD countries (about 27% of working age population). Thus, we
observe both immigrants coming from countries sharing the same official language as the native
population, and immigrants coming from countries with a different official language. To the same
extent, since Swiss linguistic areas are geographically well-delimited, Swiss nationals that moved
to other linguistic areas share the same nationality as natives but not the same language. This
provides the necessary variation for our identification strategy.
Our empirical analysis extends the nested-cell labor demand model developed by Ottaviano
and Peri (2012, OP henceforth) to account for the role played by language. In particular, we first
replicate the OP model (Model A) to estimate the elasticities of substitution between foreign and
native workers. In replicating their model, we find evidence of imperfect substitutability between
native and foreign workers. Then, we compare this elasticity with two alternative models encom-
passing workers’ main language. In Model B, we assume ex-ante perfect substitutability between
natives and foreigners with the same linguistic background and we group them together as opposed
to foreign workers with different linguistic background. As expected, we find stronger imperfect
substitutability between these two groups of workers as compared to the original OP model. In
Model C, we add the linguistic background as an additional worker’s characteristic to education
and experience. After explicitly accounting for the linguistic background, the substitutability be-
tween nationality groups increases substantially, and perfect substitutability between foreign and
native workers cannot be rejected. These results are quite robust to several robustness checks,
such as the inclusion of cross-border workers and different specifications of the model (e.g., cell
structure). Despite most of the variation in the years under investigation comes from the large
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inflow of highly and middle educated workers encouraged by the bilateral agreements on the free
movement of people between Switzerland and the EU, we show that our results are not driven by
some specific education or nationality group.
Interestingly, once we test whether natives and foreigners specialize in different jobs, we find
evidence of native specialization in communicatively intensive jobs in model A, i.e. without con-
trolling for linguistic background. By contrast, if we do control for linguistic background (model
C), the job specialization between foreign and native workers substantially decreases. In the most
demanding specification, the difference in coefficients between the two models is significant at 5%.
This suggests that the imperfect substitutability found in model A is indeed driven by different com-
parative advantages between foreigners and natives and that the natives’ comparative advantage
in more communicatively intensive tasks is driven by superior linguistic skills.
In the last part of the paper, we simulate the total wage effects of new migration inflows for the
period 1999–2017 focusing on model C, which better models workers’ skill mix. In the long run,
with full capital adjustment, the overall effect of immigration on wages is, by construction, zero.
Nevertheless, considering the wage impact of immigration by education group we find that highly
educated workers comparatively experience the most adverse impact of immigration, probably
because of the large inflow of highly educated workers in the period considered. Also, we compute
short run wage effects on native and foreign workers’ wages subdividing the time span of our
dataset into three sub-periods corresponding to migration policy changes or to changes in economic
conditions. We find that the short run yearly negative impact of migration inflows on native wages
increases after the enactment of the bilateral agreements with the EU on the free movement of
persons in 2002, and then mitigates after the beginning of the economic crisis in 2009. Furthermore,
highly educated workers bear the most adverse consequences of migration, with a yearly decrease in
wages after the enactment of the bilateral agreements of 0.9% for natives and 1.6% for foreigners.
Again, this can be explained by the upsurge in highly educated foreign workers that moved to
Switzerland after the enactment of the bilateral agreements, especially from Germany.
Differently from previous literature, we can directly identify the role of language as the channel
through which immigration impacts the labor market of the destination country. To our knowledge,
the only other paper investigating this issue is Lewis (2013). Using data from the US, he finds
that immigrants with better language skills exhibit greater substitutability for native workers than
immigrants with poor language skills. However, immigrants’ language skills in the US are likely to
be correlated with several other confounding factors because English represents a foreign language
for most immigrants who arrive in the US. Conversely, in our setting the selection concerns are
mitigated by the fact that we exploit the variation in the mother tongue of both immigrants and
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natives.
Other papers have exploited the Swiss context to infer the impact of immigration on native
wages but none of them investigate the role of language in determining labor market outcomes. For
instance, Gerfin and Kaiser (2010) replicate the OP model in Switzerland without controlling for
the linguistic background.3 It is also worth mentioning Beerli and Peri (2015), who exploit the labor
market liberalization of cross-border workers between 1999 and 2007 to infer the impact of a large
inflow of foreign workers on wages and employment opportunities. Differently from us, they find a
positive effect on the wages of highly educated workers and on the working hours of less educated
workers. The different results should be due to the large differences in the identification strategies
adopted. Indeed, while they exploit a policy instrument that only involved cross-border workers
at local labor market level, we evaluate the impact of overall migration flows at national level.
Thus, on the one hand, the wage effects computed in this paper should be better able to capture
the overall effects of immigration, considering all types of migrants (recent and non-recent) with
respect to the counterfactual of no immigration. On the other hand, their identification strategy
is more targeted to a specific policy change and is better able to capture the different facets of a
labor market liberalization.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the Swiss context.
Then, Section 2.3 presents our theoretical framework and Section 2.4 discusses the data. The
empirical specification adopted and the identification issues are discussed in Section 2.5. Section
2.6 presents the estimates of the elasticities of substitution, as well as some evidence about the role
of language in determining the specialization of natives in communicatively intensive jobs and the
simulated total wage effects of an inflow of foreign workers. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Background
With an immigrant share of about 27% of the working age population—one of the highest rates
among the OECD countries (Liebig et al., 2012)—and 4 official languages spoken in different lin-
guistic areas, Switzerland represents the ideal setting to study the impact of immigrant language
skills on labor market outcomes. The four languages spoken are German, French, Italian, and
Romansh, which are respectively spoken in the Central and Eastern part, the West, the South,
and some specific valleys in the South-East (Figure 2.1). All languages except Romansh, which is
spoken by only 0.8% of the population, are in common with bordering countries.
Starting from the post-WWII period, Switzerland also experienced several immigration waves.
3Even though they consider a different time span (1991–2008), their results are qualitatively similar to the ones
we obtain replicating of the OP model (Model A).
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The first immigration wave in the post-war period mainly involved Italians. Then, during the
’60s, new sending countries emerged: Germany, France, Austria and Spain. In the ’80s a new
inflow of workers arrived from Spain, Portugal, Turkey and former Yugoslavia. The inflow of ex-
Yugoslavians became particularly pronounced during the 90s, because of the Balkan wars. Finally,
with the enactment of the bilateral agreements with the EU on the free movement of persons in
2002, Switzerland experienced a new wave of immigration from European countries, especially from
Germany (Liebig et al., 2012).
The bilateral agreements on the free movement of persons deserve particular attention. The free
movement of persons for the EU-15 and EFTA countries was first approved in 1999.4 They allowed
citizens of EU-15/EFTA member states to live and work in Switzerland with the only requirement
of being employed or financially independent. Moreover, they introduced the harmonization of
social security systems, the mutual recognition of professional qualifications and the right to buy
properties. In 2002 the free movement of persons for EU-15/EFTA citizens started phasing in, and
in 2007 the labor market barriers to workers from these countries were completely removed. After
the enlargement of the European Union to Eastern European countries, in 2006 the free movement
of persons for the so-called EU-8 member states started phasing in too.5 Labor market barriers
for EU-8 citizens were completely removed in 2011. Finally, in 2009 the labor market integration
process started phasing in for Romania and Bulgaria. Labor market barriers for these countries
were entirely removed in 2016.
2.3 Theoretical framework
The idea behind the model proposed by OP and by prevalent models in the literature (see for
instance, Card, 2001, Borjas, 2003, Card, 2009, and Manacorda et al., 2012) is that each worker
is a perfect substitute for other workers with similar skills, but is an imperfect substitute for
workers with different skills. However, while some of the previous literature assume ex-ante perfect
substitutability between native and foreign workers with the same skill mix (i.e. Borjas, 2003), the
model adopted by OP allow for some imperfect substitutability between them. Thus, to investigate
the role of language in driving this imperfect substitutability, we modify the OP model. This
section provides a simple sketch of their theoretical framework. The interested reader should refer
to OP and Borjas (2003) for further details.
4EU-15 member states are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden. EFTA member states are Iceland, Liechtenstein,
Norway.
5EU-8 member states are Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
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2.3.1 Theoretical model
Formally, let us assume that the economy follows a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = AtL
α
t K
1−α
t (2.1)
where output Yt is produced combining the CES-type labor aggregate Lt and the capital aggregate
Kt. At is total factor productivity, while α is the share of income going to labor. The subscript t
indicates the time at which each of these aggregates is measured. Within a Solow model framework
(Solow, 1956), the Cobb-Douglas production function predicts a constant capital-output ratio and
a constant detrended capital-labor ratio in the long run, because capital readjusts to short term
shocks in labor supply. Thus, in the long run the aggregate wage does not depend on the amount
of labor supply and, consequently, the impact of immigration on wages is 0.
Now, to model the different skill mix of native and immigrant workers, we need to partition
the original labor aggregate Lt according to relevant workers’ characteristics. As an example,
workers with different education levels are not competing for the same jobs on the labor market
and may be poor substitutes for each other. Thus, workers in the overall labor aggregate Lt can be
first partitioned into subgroups according to their education attainment. However, workers within
the same education group may still not be perfect substitutes among each other. Indeed, more
experienced workers may have different skills than less experienced workers. Thus, education labor
aggregates can be further partitioned according to experience on the labor market. Iterating this
procedure, the original labor aggregate Lt in Equation (2.1) is subsequently partitioned into more
and more characteristics according to a nested structure. Within each characteristic, the imperfect
substitutability of workers in different subgroups is modelled through a CES production function.
Notice that workers’ characteristics are ranked according to an increasing degree of substitutability.
In this way, workers within the same labor aggregate are more and more homogeneous as we
partition the labor aggregate in an increasing number of characteristics.
Turning to the model, we number each characteristic with i = 1, ..., I. Then, the Mi groups
within each characteristic are numbered with g(1) = 1, ...,M1 for the first characteristic, g(2) =
1, ...,M2 for the second characteristic, etc. As a result, each labor aggregate up to characteristic
I − 1 can be written as:
Lg(i)t =
 ∑
g(i+1)∈g(i)
θg(i+1)
(
Lg(i+1)t
)σi+1−1
σi+1

σi+1
σi+1−1
(2.2)
where θg(i+1) are group specific productivity and σi+1 is the elasticity of substitution between labor
aggregates Lg(i+1)t. Group specific productivity are normalized such that
∑
g(i+1)∈g(i) θg(i+1) = 1.
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The nesting order of characteristics implies that σi+1 > σi.
Differentiating the production function with respect to each labor aggregate and equating it to
its marginal productivity we find the optimality condition for each group g within characteristic i.
As an example, the optimality condition for group g and characteristic I is:
ln(ωg(I)t) = ln
[
αAκ
(1−α)
t
]
+
1
σ1
ln(Lt)+
I∑
i=1
ln(θg(i))−
I−1∑
i=1
(
1
σi
− 1
σi+1
)
ln(Lg(i)t)−
1
σI
ln(Lg(I)t)
(2.3)
where ωg(I)t is the wage paid to workers in group g(I) at time t. κt is the capital-labor ratio and
σ1 is the elasticity of substitution between groups of the first characteristic. θg(i) are group specific
productivity, σi indexes the elasticities of substitution for characteristics i and Lg(i)t are the labor
aggregates corresponding to groups g(i) at time t.
2.3.2 Nesting structure
Figure 2.2 provides a sketch of the nesting structure of the models we are estimating. As previously
mentioned, model A replicates the OP model, where workers are subdivided according to three
characteristics: education, experience and nationality. However, we adopt different groupings of
workers within each characteristic to better tailor the model to the Swiss labor market and education
system and, at the same time, limiting the number of cells to guarantee a sufficient number of
individuals in each cell. Specifically, we partition labor aggregates according to three education
groups (low, medium and high), two experience groups (young and old), and two nationality groups
(natives and foreigners). Further details on group construction are provided in the next section.
To investigate the role of language in driving the substitutability between native and foreign
workers, in models B and C we modify this structure. If language plays a role, foreigners with
different linguistic background should be less substitutable with respect to native workers than
foreigners with the same linguistic background. Thus, in model B we assume ex-ante perfect
substitutability between foreigners with the same linguistic background and natives and we group
them together in the definition of nationality groups, as opposed to foreign workers with a different
linguistic background. Then, we attempt to control directly for the linguistic background of native
and foreign workers considering the linguistic background as an additional characteristic of the
workers’ skill mix. As a result, in model C we further partition the labor aggregates according to
the linguistic background, assuming that workers within the same linguistic background but with
different nationalities are more substitutable than workers with the same nationality but a different
linguistic background. Even though this assumption may be reasonable, we also test for the other
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possibility, i.e. that workers with the same nationality but a different linguistic background are
more substitutable than workers with a different nationality and the same linguistic background.
2.4 Data and descriptive statistics
In this section we discuss the major data issues, while the details are left to Appendix 2.B. Data
are drawn from the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) for the period 1999–2017. We restrict
the dataset to people aged 18 or above with active working status and remunerated work in the
previous week. We also drop individuals in military service or in education. Our sample size
prior to collapsing by cell consists of 446,304 observations. Given the large number of cells (228
year-education-experience-nationality cells in model A and B and 456 year-education-experience-
linguistic background-nationality cells in model C) we prefer to report the main estimates without
further partitioning by gender, since this would further reduce the precision of the estimates.
Separate results for men and women are available in Appendix 2.C.
We also exploit the information contained in the O*NET database to understand whether work-
ers with different linguistic backgrounds specialize in different occupations. O*NET is a database
developed for the US containing a detailed description of the skills required by each type of job.
Particularly, for every occupation a score between 0 and 100 is assigned to each skill, according
to experts’ judgement. This score corresponds to the importance of that skill to perform the job.
Following Peri and Sparber (2009), we derive a measure of the communication content of each
occupation averaging the importance scores of four basic communication skills (Oral and Written
Comprehension, Oral and Written Expression). To the same extent, we define an extended measure
of communication skills adding cognitive, analytical and vocal skills to the four basic skills listed
above. More details on the construction of these measures are available in Appendix 2.B.
Given the structure of the Swiss education system, we subdivide workers according to three
education groups. In the first group we include workers that only completed compulsory education
or basic vocational training. In the second group we include workers with full vocational training,
high school diploma, or tertiary vocational training. Finally, in the third group we include workers
with college education.
Then, we subdivide individuals according to their potential experience in the labor market.
Potential experience is computed as the difference between current age and the age at which in-
dividuals should have completed education.6 While OP adopt a specification with 8 experience
6We assume that people with compulsory education entered in the labor market at age 14, people with basic
vocational training entered at age 16, people with apprenticeship or full time vocational training at age 18, people
with high school diploma at age 19, people with tertiary vocational training at age 22 and people with college
education at age 24.
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groups (5-year intervals), in the present context partitioning workers into such a large number of
experience groups leads to implausible high estimates of the elasticity of substitution, suggesting
almost no role for experience. Indeed, narrow experience groups may decrease the number of obser-
vations per cell too much, increasing the noise and the substitutability across groups. To overcome
this issue and obtain elasticities of substitution in line with the previous literature, we only use two
broad experience groups (as in Katz and Murphy, 1992). Specifically, we define workers with up
to 15 years of experience (first tercile of the experience distribution) as “young” and workers with
more than 15 years of experience as “old”. People with zero or more than 40 years of experience are
left out of the sample. Further discussion on this issue and some sensitivity analysis are provided
in Section 2.6.3.
Nationality cells are defined according to citizenship. People with Swiss citizenship are defined
as Swiss, while people with non-Swiss citizenship are defined as non-Swiss.7
Finally, linguistic background cells are defined according to the main language spoken by the
individual. The main language spoken by Swiss citizens is inferred by the language in which
the questionnaire has been completed. The languages available to complete the questionnaire are
German, French and Italian. For simplicity, we drop individuals living in Romansh speaking areas
from the sample (around 1,000 individuals out of 446,000). Swiss citizens that decide to complete
the questionnaire in a different language from the main language spoken in the area of residence are
counted as “different linguistic background”. They are counted as “same linguistic background”
otherwise. To the same extent, the main language spoken by foreigners is inferred from the official
languages of their country of citizenship and foreigners are assigned to linguistic background cells
accordingly. The specific nationalities included in each linguistic background group are listed in
Appendix 2.B.4.
Labor aggregates are constructed according to the number of hours actually provided the week
before. We drop from the sample individuals with missing values or zero hours worked. Then, we
multiply the hours worked by each individual by his personal weight (provided by the SLFS) and
we sum up the number of weighted hours by cell.
To compute the average weekly wage by cell we divide annual net income by 52 and we drop
observations with income equal to zero.8 Also, we trim 1% of the observations at the top and at the
bottom of the income distribution. Then, we obtain real wages adjusting nominal wages according
to the price consumer index. Finally, we average wages by cell weighting each observation by the
number of hours worked times the personal weight.9
7Swiss citizens with double citizenship are considered as Swiss. More details are provided in the Appendix 2.B.3.
8In the SLFS there is no information about the number of weeks worked in a year.
9Since in Switzerland part-time jobs are widespread, differently from OP we do not restrict the sample to full-time
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2.4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.1 lists the 5 most represented nationalities among immigrants with the same linguistic
background and immigrants with different linguistic background in the SLFS. It is worth noting
that Italian immigrants appear in both groups. They represent the largest group among immigrants
with a different linguistic background (especially in the German speaking part of Switzerland), but
also the largest immigrant group in the Italian speaking region.
Table 2.2 shows the percentage variation in native wages and in hours worked by foreign workers
between 1999 and 2017 by education, experience and linguistic background group. In the period
considered, the percentage increase in hours worked by foreign workers is particularly pronounced
among the highly educated, while it is negative among the low educated. This is in line with the
findings of Beerli and Peri (2015) and Beerli and Indergand (2015), that find evidence of a shift in
labor demand towards highly educated workers. By contrast, native workers experienced negative
real wage growth for almost all groups.
Finally, Table 2.3 provides the average scores for communication skills by education group. As
expected, workers with the same linguistic background perform jobs with a higher communication
content with respect to workers with a different linguistic background and highly educated workers
perform jobs with a higher communication content with respect to low educated workers. These
results are consistent across nationality groups. This suggests that even though natives that decide
to move to other linguistic areas may have a superior knowledge of the language of destination than
non-movers, there are still differences in the linguistic content of their jobs with respect to local
natives. Indeed, a mean comparison test between natives and foreigners with same and different
linguistic background always rejects the null of equal means in the communication content of jobs
(except for middle educated native workers).10 Table 2.C.1 provides the same information for the
extended definition of communication skills.
2.5 Estimation and identification
We begin by estimating the elasticities of substitution between nationality groups. The empirical
specification to be estimated can be obtained taking the ratio between the optimality conditions
in Equation (2.3) for foreigners and natives. Particularly, we regress the ratio between the average
wages of Swiss and foreign workers against the ratio of total hours supplied by the two groups.
workers. Indeed, restricting the sample to people working 30 hours per week or more reduces our sample size by 25%.
However, the weighting procedure of wages should account for differences in hours supplied.
10We perform two different types of mean comparison tests. The first one is unconditional, while in the second one
we also control for sex, experience, and education. Also, controlling for the European origin of foreign workers does
not change the test results. In all the regressions, observations are weighted by hours worked times personal weight.
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Formally, we estimate the following equation:
ln
(
ωrF t
ωrNt
)
= ψr + λt + βnat ln
(
LrF t
LrNt
)
+ εrt (2.4)
where r indicates the generic labor aggregate partitioning up to nationality. The coefficient βnat is
the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between nationality groups (i.e., βnat = 1/σnat). This im-
plies that the smaller the coefficient, the larger the elasticity of substitution, i.e. the substitutability
between workers. ψr is a group fixed effect and corresponds to the ratio between nationality fixed
effects (i.e., ψr = ln(θrF /θrN )). Group fixed effects should capture the differences in productivity
between different education-experience-linguistic background combinations. λt accounts for time
fixed effects and εrt is a stochastic component independent of ln (LrF t/LrNt). To account for the
differences in the number of workers with specific characteristics, all the regressions are weighted by
the share of foreign workers to native workers by cell.11 If fixed effects are correctly specified, the
error term is independent of the labor aggregates, since all the endogeneity should be absorbed by
group and time specific fixed effects.12 If this assumption holds, immigration can be regarded as an
exogenous shock allowing for the identification of the beta parameter (and thus, of the elasticity of
substitution between nationality groups). Since group specific productivies sum up to 1, they can
be retrieved from the definition of ψr through the formulas θrF =
exp(ψr)
1+exp(ψr)
and θrN =
1
1+exp(ψr)
.
Now, we can retrieve the labor aggregate Lrt from Equation (2.2). In this way, in construct-
ing the labor aggregates of less substitutable characteristics we account for the imperfect substi-
tutability between workers of different nationalities. The average wages, instead, can be computed
averaging the wages of different nationality groups by the share of labor provided by that group,
i.e.:
ω¯rt = ωrF t
(
LrF t
Lrt
)
+ ωrNt
(
LrNt
Lrt
)
(2.5)
From now on, to estimate the elasticities of substitution between upper level characteristics it is
possible to revert to the original Borjas approach and use the hours worked by migrant workers
as a supply shock to instrument the overall hours worked in each education-experience-linguistic
background cell. Indeed, hours of labor provided by natives may be endogenous to wages. However,
if fixed effects are correctly specified migration should be mainly driven by demographic factors and
the variation in the amount of labor provided by foreign workers across cells can be used to identify
11Indeed, the number of workers may differ across cells, influencing both labor aggregates and average wages.
Weighting the regressions for the number of workers in each cell should account for this.
12Note that taking the ratio between the optimality conditions in Equation (2.3) it would be sufficient to control
for group fixed effects ψr, since all the other terms are washed out. As noted by OP, since we use ratios of wages
and labor supply within groups, any variation of group specific productivity would cancel out. However, in our
baseline econometric specification we prefer to include time fixed effects as well, to account for possible year-specific
differential trends in wages between nationality groups.
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the impact of an increase in labor supply on wages.13 Thus, we proceed to the 2SLS estimation of
the other characteristic’s elasticities of substitution exploiting the optimality condition in Equation
(2.3) and instrumenting the labor aggregate Lrt with immigrant labor supply LrF t. Again, the
estimated coefficients are the inverse of the elasticities of substitution (i.e. βi = 1/σi). This
procedure is iterated up to the estimation of the elasticity of substitution across education labor
aggregates.14
2.5.1 Total wage effect
The main advantage of a nested CES framework consists in the possibility to derive the total wage
effect of immigration. The reduced form approach usually focuses only on a partial wage effect,
i.e. the impact of foreign workers on the wage of native workers within the same education and
experience group. However, an inflow of foreign workers also affects workers in different cells,
because of the imperfect substitutability between workers with different skill mix. The nested
CES structure accounts for these additional wage effects across cells, overcoming the major flaw
of a reduced form approach. Particularly, let sig(I) denote the share of labor income of workers of
type g(I) sharing the same characteristics up to i. Then, from Equation (2.3) we can derive the
percentage variation in wages of another group of workers h(I) due to an inflow of workers in group
g(I).15 Assuming that workers of type g(I) and workers of type h(I) share the same characteristics
up to characteristic c, the percentage wage change for workers h(I) can be written as:
∆ω0h(I)/ω
0
h(I)
∆Lg(I)/Lg(I)
=
s0g(I)
σ1
> 0, c = 0 (2.6)
and
∆ωch(I)/ω
c
h(I)
∆Lg(I)/Lg(I)
= −
c−1∑
i=0
si+1g(I) − sig(I)
σi+1
< 0, c = 1, ..., I (2.7)
Equation (2.6) implies that an inflow of workers in group g(I) has a positive impact on the wages
of workers in group h(I) if the workers of the two groups do not share the first characteristic. In
13This approach is quite standard in the literature on the impact of migration at national level. As noted by Borjas
(2003), if demographic factors are not the sole drivers of migration, higher wages should trigger higher migration
inflows, inducing a positive correlation between hours worked and wages. If this is the case, the estimated coefficients
should be biased towards 0, and the estimates of the elasticities of substitution provide an upper bound of the true
elasticities of substitution.
14Note that controlling for the correct specification of fixed effects is extremely important for the estimation of
upper level coefficients, since all the terms in Equation (2.3) that washed out taking the ratio between nationality
groups do not vanish anymore. Thus, including time fixed effects becomes now very important to account for the
group-invariant terms of Equation (2.3) (i.e. ln[αAκ
(1−α)
t ] +
1
σedu
ln(Lt)). In addition, group fixed effects account for
the time-invariant terms (i.e.
∑I
i=1 ln(θg(i))). The fixed effects controlling for the other terms in Equation (2.3) (i.e.∑I−1
i=1
(
1
σi
− 1
σi+1
)
ln(Lg(i)t)), depend on the structure of the model chosen and are further discussed in Section 2.6.
15The interested reader can find the proof in OP.
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contrast, if groups g(I) and h(I) share at least one characteristic, an inflow of workers in group
g(I) depresses the wages of workers in group h(I). This effect is stronger the larger the number of
characteristics the two groups have in common.
To assess the total wage effect of immigration, we perform a simulation. Particularly, for each
estimated elasticity parameter we take 5,000 random draws from a joint normal distribution and
we compute the percentage wage change induced by the percentage increase in foreign workers in
the period considered combining these simulated values with the labor income shares of each group
of workers. Then, we average these percentage wage changes across random draws to obtain the
average wage effect and the standard deviation for each experience-education-linguistic background
group. Finally, average wage effects and standard errors are aggregated at higher levels using the
appropriate wage shares. A detailed description of the method adopted is provided in Appendix 2.A.
Long run and short run wage effects
An inflow of foreign workers may divert the capital-labor ratio from its long run trend. In the
standard Solow (1956) model the capital-labor ratio is assumed to grow at a positive constant rate.
However, immigration inflows decrease the capital-labor ratio, causing the marginal productivity of
capital to increase. In the long run, the greater investments in capital will bring the capital-labor
ratio back to its original growth path. Thus, the aggregate impact of labor inflows on wages is zero
in the long run because of capital readjustment. However, in the short run there could be some
negative effects due to a sluggish capital response to labor inflows. In our simulation we present two
alternative scenarios. The first scenario shows the long run effects of immigration, assuming full
readjustment of capital. The second scenario shows the effects in the very short run, assuming fixed
capital. Since immigration is not an unpredictable shock in time and investors continuously respond
to labor inflows, this latter assumption may be too strict. However, the simulated wage effects in
the second scenario may be considered as lower bounds of the true wage impact of immigration.
Greater details are provided in Appendix 2.A.
2.5.2 Identification issues
One major concern about the empirical strategy may involve the area of origin of foreign workers. If
foreign-born workers in different education or linguistic background groups are very different from
each other, the elasticities of substitution we are estimating may be driven by nationality effects. For
instance, foreign workers coming from Western Europe may be clustered in some specific linguistic
background-education groups (e.g., same language and high education), while people coming from
other countries may be clustered in other groups. Reassuringly, the upper panel in Figure 2.3
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shows the common support in the area of origin by education group. Each bar represents the share
of migrants from a different area of origin: Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Africa and other
nationalities.16 All the areas of origin are well represented in all the three education groups, even
though the share of workers from Western Europe is slightly larger among the highly educated.
To the same extent, the bottom panel in Figure 2.3 represents the distribution of areas of origin
by linguistic group. Western European countries are represented in both groups. However, the
great majority of migrants with the same linguistic background comes from Western Europe, while
Eastern European countries are not represented at all. Nevertheless, as shown in Section 2.6.3, our
estimates are robust to the exclusion of Eastern European migrants.17
As shown by Dustmann et al. (2013), allocating immigrants into skill cells might represent
another possible threat for our identification strategy if immigrants downgrade considerably upon
arrival—leading them to be overqualified, at least on paper, for the job they perform. This may
happen for a number of reasons, such as the difficult comparability of the educational system in the
origin country, the lack of knowledge of the job market in the destination country, lower reservation
wages, etc. If this is the case, foreign workers are not directly competing with native workers with
their same education attainment, but with native workers with a lower education level. As a result,
comparing native and foreign workers within the same education group may be misleading. In
the Swiss case, this should be less of a concern since foreign workers mainly come from European
countries and, more generally, the entrance in the Swiss labor market is heavily regulated. However,
Table 2.4 reports the number and the share of foreign and native workers by occupational category
for middle educated workers. Even though foreign workers may be slightly more represented within
occupations requiring lower education, the overall distributions of foreign and native workers seem
to be quite similar, suggesting that the amount of downgrading of middle educated workers is not
worrisome in our context. Table 2.C.2 in the Appendix reports similar evidence for highly educated
workers.
Another concern may involve the greater ability of highly educated workers to learn the language
of the destination area, or their use of English as working language. Notice that since the elasticity
of substitution between nationality groups is an average over different education groups, the greater
ability of highly and middle educated workers to learn a new language should bias the estimates
towards 0, i.e. towards perfect substitutability. Moreover, this effect should be homogeneous across
models B and C and should not affect the main conclusions of the paper. In Section 2.6.3, we provide
16Eastern Europe includes all the former Soviet Union countries, ex-Yugoslavia countries and Turkey.
17To give an idea of how migrants with same and different linguistic background are distributed across Switzerland,
we provide some maps of their distribution at spatial mobility region level (i.e. local labor markets). However, since
in the empirical analysis we are not exploiting the variation in the geographical distribution of migrants, but only
the variation within different cells, these maps are reported in Appendix (Figure 2.C.1).
68
an additional robustness check excluding highly educated workers from the sample.
Finally, a serious limitation of the SLFS is the lack of cross-border workers, who represent a
non-negligible share of foreign workers. Particularly, in the Swiss labor market there are around
300,000 cross-border workers, representing roughly 8% of total employment and 30% of foreign
workers.18 For this reason, we perform a robustness check complementing the SLFS data with
data coming from the Swiss Earning Structure Survey (SESS), a biannual survey administered to
approximately 35,000 firms about the earnings of employees in the secondary and tertiary sectors,
including cross-border workers. The results are in line with our main findings and are further
discussed in Section 2.6.3.
2.6 Results
We begin by estimating the elasticity of substitution between nationality groups for our three models
A, B, and C. Table 2.5 presents the estimated coefficients (βnat = 1/σnat). To correctly interpret
the results, recall that in these models an elasticity of substitution σnat close to ∞ corresponds to
perfect substitutability, while smaller values of σnat reveal the presence of imperfect substitutability.
For each model we present three specifications that differ in the fixed effects included. In the first
specification we only include group and time fixed effects. Then, in the second specification we
add time by education fixed effects. These effects capture possible systematic differences in wage
trends across education groups. Finally, following Borjas et al. (2008), in the third specification we
also add time by experience fixed effects for models A and B and time by experience and time by
linguistic background fixed effects for model C.
In model A, our benchmark model based on OP, the inclusion of time by education fixed
effects substantially improves the precision of the estimates, leading to a negative and statistically
significant coefficient of −0.081. Adding time by experience fixed effects decreases the magnitude
of this coefficient to −0.048. These values correspond to an elasticity of substitution, σnat, of 12
and 21. The second estimate is in line with the results of OP, who find an elasticity of substitution
between native and foreign workers around 20. On the other hand, Manacorda et al. (2012), using
data from the UK Labor Force Survey, find an elasticity of substitution between nationality groups
around 7. Thus, we can conclude that our results are quite in line with previous literature and that
native and foreign workers are fairly imperfect substitutes in the Swiss labor market. As suggested
by Peri and Sparber (2009), this imperfect substitutability may be driven by residual differences in
the actual skill mix of immigrant and native workers which induce them to specialize in different
18The number of cross-border workers is released every year by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. We compute
the incidence of cross-border workers on total employment and foreign workers from SESS data.
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occupations. In Section 2.6.1 we explicitly investigate the role of language in determining the
specialization of workers in different occupations.
In model B natives and foreigners with the same linguistic background are grouped together as
opposed to foreigners with a different linguistic background. If language plays a role in determining
the substitutability between native and foreign workers we expect larger coefficients with respect
to model A, i.e. lower substitutability between foreigners with a different linguistic background
and the other groups of workers. Indeed, the estimated coefficients are larger than those estimated
in Model A and range between −0.112 and −0.128. These values correspond to an elasticity of
substitution between 8 and 9, pointing towards a non-negligible role of language in determining the
imperfect substitutability between nationality groups.
Finally, including the linguistic background as an additional workers’ characteristic (model C)
the estimated coefficients become essentially zero. In all the specifications, the null hypothesis of a
zero coefficient, i.e. perfect substitutability, cannot be rejected. Overall, these results underscore
the importance of language in driving the substitutability between foreign and native workers.
After estimating the elasticity of substitution between nationality groups, we can recursively
estimate the elasticities of substitution for the other workers’ characteristics, i.e. linguistic back-
ground, experience and education. These elasticities are reported in the Appendix (Tables 2.C.3–
2.C.5). Clearly, the only model in which workers are grouped according to their linguistic back-
ground is model C. Controlling for group and time fixed effects (Column (1)) leads to an estimated
elasticity of substitution of 15. However, in this model the inclusion of time by education fixed
effects leads to a weak instrument problem. Indeed, given the low variation over time in the hours
supplied by workers in the middle education group, time by education fixed effects absorb all the
variation in the first stage regression. For this reason, we include a third less demanding speci-
fication, replacing group fixed effects with education, experience and linguistic background fixed
effects and linguistic background by education fixed effects (Column (3)). This allows us to over-
come the weak instrument problem and the resulting estimated elasticity ends up to be similar to
the elasticity of substitution estimated in Column (1).
Regarding the other workers’ characteristics (i.e., experience and education) the estimated elas-
ticities of substitution are consistent with the elasticities of substitution estimated in the literature.
It is only worth mentioning that in the case of education we end up with 57 observations. This
implies that we do not have sufficient degrees of freedom to include time by education fixed ef-
fects.19 Thus, we only control for education specific time trends. The results imply an elasticity of
substitution across education groups which varies between 4 and 6.
19In the baseline specification we are also controlling for 19 year fixed effects and 3 education fixed effects.
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It is also interesting to look at the degree of imperfect substitutability between linguistic back-
ground groups holding workers’ nationality fixed. In other words, we invert the order between
linguistic background and nationality characteristics in model C. Although this nesting structure is
misspecified, this result can still be informative about the determinants of workers’ substitutabil-
ity.20 Table 2.C.6 in Appendix presents the results. The elasticity of substitution between linguistic
background groups is between 7 and 11. Notice that this value is fairly similar to the elasticity of
substitution between nationality groups estimated in model A, reinforcing the idea that language
plays an essential role in determining the imperfect substitutability between workers, even between
workers of the same nationality.
2.6.1 Job specialization
So far we showed the importance of the linguistic background in determining the elasticity of
substitution between native and foreign workers. In this section we investigate whether workers
with a different linguistic background specialize in different types of jobs. To this end, we focus on
the communication skills required by each job and we perform the following regression:
ln
(
CrF t
CrNt
)
= ψr + λt + β ln
(
LrF t
LrNt
)
+ εrt (2.8)
where CrF t and CrNt are respectively the average communication skills required by foreign and
native workers’ jobs.21 As before, ψr and λt are group and time fixed effects, while LrF t and LrNt
are the hours of labor provided by foreigners and natives. Note that this is the same regression
as in Equation (2.4) but we replace the dependent variable with the ratio between the average
communication skills of foreigners’ jobs and the average communication skills of natives’ jobs. If
natives and foreigners specialize in different types of jobs we expect an inflow of foreign workers to
decrease the foreign-to-native ratio in communication skills, either increasing the average commu-
nication content of natives’ jobs or decreasing the communication content of foreigners’ jobs. Then,
we compare the regression results in model A, that do not account for the linguistic background,
with the regression results in model C, that explicitly control for the linguistic background.
The results reported in Table 2.6 uphold our theoretical predictions. As expected, in Model
A we find evidence of a significant relationship between immigration and job specialization. In
particular, a one standard deviation increase in the relative supply of foreign workers, LrF t/LrNt
(that corresponds to a 3.5 percentage points change in the relative supply of foreign workers)
20Since the elasticity of substitution between linguistic background groups is smaller than the elasticity of substitu-
tion between nationality groups, this model specification is incorrect. In a robust specification of the model, workers’
characteristics should be ordered according to increasing degree of substitutability.
21Further details on the construction of this variable are provided in Appendix 2.B.8.
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decreases the foreign-to-native ratio in communication skills, CrF t/CrNt, of .17 percentage points.
In other words, an inflow of foreign workers would either increase the average communication
content of natives’ jobs or lead immigrants towards more manual occupations.22
The differential job specialization between foreign and native workers substantially decreases
after controlling for the linguistic background (Model C). Moreover, after accounting for time by
experience and time by linguistic background fixed effects, the estimated coefficient in Model C
(Column (6)) is statistically different at 5% with respect to the estimated coefficient in Model A
(Column (3)). Results adopting the extended definition of communication skills are also consistent
(see Table 2.C.7 in Appendix).
2.6.2 Simulated total wage effects
In this section we present the simulated total wage effects of new immigration flows. In doing this,
we focus on model C, that better captures the different skill mix of workers. As discussed in Section
2.5.1, we use the estimated elasticities of substitution as key parameters of joint normal distributions
and we simulate the wage effects averaging percentage wage changes over 5,000 random draws.23
Table 2.7 reports the simulation results. In the first column we report long run estimates for
the whole period under investigation, i.e. 1999–2017. Panels A and B of Table 2.7 present the wage
effects respectively for native and foreign workers. Each panel reports the overall wage effect and
the wage effects by education group. Since new immigrants are assumed to be perfect substitutes
for previous immigrants, previous immigrant workers bear the most adverse consequences of immi-
gration. Interestingly, even in the long run, highly educated workers seem to be negatively affected
by the migration inflows.
The last three columns of Table 2.7 report short run simulation results for three sub-periods:
before the enactment of the bilateral agreements on the free movement of persons (years 1999–
2001), between the enactment of the bilateral agreements and the beginning of the economic crisis
(years 2002-2008) and after the start of the economic crisis (years 2009-2017). These effects are
not directly comparable with the long run estimates in the first column of Table 2.7. However,
they represent the lower bound wage impacts of migration inflows within the three sub-periods of
interest. Moreover, since these three sub-periods differ in length, it is useful to compare yearly wage
effects, computed as the reported coefficients divided by the number of years in the sub-period. The
wage impact of immigration flows is largest after the enactment of the bilateral agreements with the
22In a separate robustness check, we also ascertain whether the effect comes from a increase in the native-born
supply of communication tasks (denominator) or a decrease in the foreign-born supply of the same tasks (numerator).
Our results significantly support both channels.
23Particularly,we plug into the normal distributions a value of 1/σ equal to 0.010 for nationality groups, 0.085 for
linguistic background groups, 0.185 for experience groups and 0.257 for education groups.
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EU (Column 3), especially for highly educated workers. Indeed, between 2002 and 2008 the large
inflow of highly educated workers negatively affected the wages of highly educated native workers
by 0.9% per year and the wages of highly educated foreign workers by 1.6% per year. We also find
some negative effects on low educated workers, but the impact is smaller in magnitude (−0.2% per
year for natives and −0.3% per year for foreigners). These effects mitigate in the aftermath of the
economic crisis (Column 4).
2.6.3 Robustness checks
Tables 2.C.8–2.C.11 in Appendix present the estimated coefficients separately for men and women.
Partitioning the labor aggregate by gender, the precision of the estimates significantly decreases,
with larger standard errors with respect to the main estimates, especially for women. The estimated
coefficients by gender are generally smaller than the estimated coefficients for the pooled sample
in models A and B and have the wrong sign in model C. Moving to upper level characteristics,
the elasticities of substitution between groups are often positive for women, suggesting that the
cell specification adopted for the pooled sample may not be appropriate for women alone. This
could be due to the peculiar structure of the Swiss labor market, where the female participation
rate is rather high (about 80% in 2015 according to OECD estimates), but where about 45% of
women work part-time (less than 30 hours per week) (OECD, 2016a). For men, the elasticities
of substitution between linguistic background, experience and education groups show negative
coefficients. However, in many cases the first stage F-statistic is very low, suggesting a weak
instrument problem. Moreover, where the F-statistic is particularly low, the estimated elasticities
of substitution are also implausibly low. As a result, pooling together men and women is particularly
important to increase the predictive power of the instrument and the precision of our estimates.
As already mentioned, we also test the robustness of our estimates to the inclusion of cross-
border workers using data from the SESS. Unfortunately, the SESS does not contain data about the
language spoken by workers (nor about the nationality of foreign workers) and cannot be used to
replicate the empirical analysis of this paper. However, assuming that cross-border workers have the
same linguistic background as native workers, we compute the incidence of cross-border workers’
wages and hours provided out of foreign population by cell, and we inflate the wage and labor
aggregates in the SLFS according to these shares. Since the SESS is a biannual survey, we linearly
interpolate the missing years. Given that this imputation procedure may affect the consistency of
the results, the estimated coefficients should be interpreted with caution. Table 2.C.12 shows the
elasticities of substitution between native and foreign workers. The estimated coefficients are in
line with the main results.
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Since in these models workers’ characteristics are ordered according to an increasing degree of
substitutability, we also provide a robustness check inverting the order of experience and linguistic
background characteristics in model C. Results are presented in Table 2.C.13. To overcome the
weak instrument problem, in Column (4) and (6) we report the estimated coefficients controlling for
education, linguistic background and/or experience fixed effects separately rather than controlling
for group fixed effects. However, the coefficients for linguistic background groups are smaller in
magnitude than the coefficients for experience, suggesting a larger elasticity of substitution between
linguistic background groups. Thus, the original specification of model C should be preferred.
Then, we also provide some sensitivity analysis about the definition of experience groups. The
upper part of Table 2.C.14 shows the estimated coefficients with 8 experience groups for model
A.24 The estimated elasticities of substitution between different experience groups are implausibly
high, as there are no similar results in the literature. Moreover, given the large number of cells
and the high substitutability between experience groups, the coefficients for nationality groups are
not significant anymore. Thus, we re-estimate the model defining experience groups according
to terciles, i.e. three experience cells with the same number of observations. The first tercile
corresponds to people with less than 15 years of experience, the second tercile corresponds to
people between 15 and 25 years of experience and the third tercile corresponds to people between
26 and 40 years of experience. The bottom part of Table 2.C.14 shows the coefficients estimated
adopting this group specification. Again, the coefficients for nationality are not significant and the
elasticities of substitution for experience groups are still implausibly high. Thus, since the median
workers in the second and the third experience terciles are much similar terms of acquired skills
and wages with respect to the median worker in the first tercile, in the main analysis we decide to
group together the second and the third terciles.25
With respect to education groups, we try to understand how their definition impacts the final
results. To do so we first group together middle and highly educated workers. Then, we replicate
the analysis grouping together low and middle educated workers. Table 2.C.15 shows the elasticities
of substitution between nationality groups in the three models with these different definitions of
education groups. Indeed, results grouping middle educated workers together with highly educated
workers are very similar to the results in the main specification. On the other hand, grouping middle
educated workers together with low educated workers makes all the estimates very imprecise and
not significant. This suggests that middle educated workers better substitute highly educated
workers than low educated workers. For the sake of conciseness, we do not report the coefficients
24Results for models B and C are similar and are not reported.
25To define the “young” group we also considered a lower experience threshold (i.e., first quartile). However, the
reduction in the number of workers in many cells leads to very imprecise estimates.
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for linguistic background, experience or education. However, in both cases these elasticities are
much more imprecise, suggesting that the specification with three different education groups is the
most appropriate one.
An important concern about this analysis is the fact that foreign workers with the same linguistic
background mainly come from Western European countries, while migrants from Eastern Europe
always have a different linguistic background. To reassure the reader against this caveat, we perform
a robustness check excluding migrants from Eastern Europe from the sample. Notice that this
procedure is inconsistent with the theory, since elasticities should always be computed on labor
aggregates defined recursively subdividing the overall labor aggregate in the economy. Within this
framework, excluding a subgroup of individuals from the sample may induce some mechanical bias
in the estimated elasticities. This bias may have different direction according to the wage pattern
and the type of workers excluded. However, even adopting this incorrect procedure, elasticity
estimates are robust to the exclusion of these workers. Results are presented in Table 2.C.16.
As discussed in Section 2.5.2, we exclude highly educated workers from the sample as further
robustness check. The estimates of the elasticities of substitution between nationality groups are
reported in Table 2.C.17. As expected, the results are still consistent across the three models, with
all the coefficients slightly increasing in magnitude.
Finally, we replicate the analysis constructing labor aggregates using contract hours or employ-
ment instead of the actual number of hours worked the week before. Also, we replicate the analysis
without weighting the regressions by the number of workers per cell. In both cases, results are
qualitatively similar to the main estimates and are not reported.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper investigates the role of language in determining the substitutability between foreign
and native workers. The main advantage of the Swiss context is that we can compare the labor
market outcomes of natives and foreigners with a different linguistic background. We exploit the
linguistic diversity of Switzerland and we modify the model proposed by Ottaviano and Peri (2012)
to account for the linguistic background of immigrants and natives.
The results confirm the importance of language in determining the substitutability between
native and foreign workers. After accounting for the linguistic background, the elasticity of sub-
stitution between foreign and native workers dramatically increases, approaching perfect substi-
tutability. Moreover, the native workers’ specialization in more communicatively intensive jobs
substantially decreases. Overall, immigrant workers sharing the linguistic background of the in-
cumbent population are potentially perfect substitutes for natives, while natives with a different
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linguistic background are not, as well as foreigners with a different linguistic background.
Finally, we exploit the nested CES structure to compute the total impact of immigration on
wages. The wage effects of migration in the long run are small (+0.7% for natives and −3.0% for
foreigners) and not significant for natives. In computing short run effects we subdivide the time
horizon under consideration in three sub-periods and we simulate the percentage wage changes
separately for each of them. We find that highly educated workers experienced some adverse wage
effects from the recent migration inflows. This negative effect is larger after the enactment of the
bilateral agreements (years 2002–2008) and decreases after the burst of the economic crisis (years
2009–2017).26 Paradoxically, these results suggest that the inflow of highly educated workers from
neighboring countries who share the natives’ linguistic background may have reduced the level of
wage inequality across education groups, or at least mitigated the labor market trends observed in
many developed economies showing an increasing level of wage inequality over time (e.g., Acemoglu
and Autor, 2011).
Even though the peculiarity of the Swiss context does not allow for a direct generalization of
the results, the main conclusions of this paper can be extended to other high income countries.
For instance, foreign workers in the US or in the UK should be less likely to speak English as a
mother tongue language with respect to the average migrant in Switzerland. Thus, the differential
specialization in more manual intensive tasks for migrant workers is more likely to take place and
to be stronger. This is in line with the results by Lewis (2013). To the same extent, if the average
migrant is less likely to be skilled than in Switzerland, the differential specialization in more manual
intensive tasks is also more likely to be stronger. From the migrant point of view, these results also
highlight the importance of linguistic training.
26It is also worth mentioning that these results should not be read as an exhaustive cost-benefit analysis of the free
movement of persons, for at least two reasons. First, the welfare gains of Swiss workers that emigrated as a result of
the bilateral agreements are not included in the analysis. Second, the bilateral agreements on the free movement of
persons were enacted at the same time of other free trade agreements which may have had additional consequences
on migration.
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Figure 2.1: Linguistic areas across Switzerland
Notes - Colors correspond to different linguistic areas. Green corresponds to the French speaking area, brown to the German
speaking area, purple to the Italian speaking area, and violet to the Romansh speaking area. Linguistic areas: FRE - French;
GER - German; ROM - Romansh; ITA - Italian.
Sources: c©OFS, ThemaKart.
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Figure 2.2: A comparison of the three models
Notes - Education groups are defined as: Low education (L): Compulsory education, elementary vocational training, household
work, school for general education; Middle education (M): Apprenticeship, full-time vocational training, high school education,
tertiary vocational training; High education (H): College education. Experience groups are defined as: Young (Y): up to 15
years of potential experience in the labor market; Old (O): Between 16 and 40 years of potential experience in the labor market.
Linguistic background types are defined as: Different linguistic background (DL); Same linguistic background (SL). Nationality
groups are defined as: Foreigners (F); Swiss Nationals (N). In model B the nationality groups are defined as: Foreigners with
different linguistic background (Fdl); Swiss nationals (N); Foreigners with same linguistic background (Fsl).
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Figure 2.3: Share of foreign workers by area of origin, education and linguistic background group
0
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Low Middle High
West Europe East Europe Africa Other
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Different language Same language
West Europe East Europe Africa Other
Notes - Each bar represents the share of foreign workers by area of origin out of foreign workers within each education or linguistic
background group. Individuals are classified as foreigners if they do not have Swiss citizenship. West Europe includes Andorra,
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, UK, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Malta, Monaco,
Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Portugal, San Marino, Sweden, Spain, Vatican City, Cyprus. East Europe includes Albania,
Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus. Africa includes African
countries. Other includes foreign workers from North and South America, Asia and Oceania. Education groups are defined as:
Low education: Compulsory education, elementary vocational training, household work, school for general education; Middle
education: Apprenticeship, full-time vocational training, high school education, tertiary vocational training; High education:
College education. Foreign workers are considered of different linguistic background if their country of citizenship has a different
official language with respect to the language spoken in the linguistic area of residence in Switzerland. They are considered of
same linguistic background otherwise.
Sources: SLFS - years 1999-2017.
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Table 2.1: List of nationalities by linguistic background
Same linguistic background Different linguistic background
Nationality Observations Obs X Personal Nationality Observations Obs X Personal
weights weights
Germany 31,767 2,217,896 Italy 26,188 2,291,239
France 8,914 737,969 Portugal 16,675 1,869,561
Italy 7,548 400,037 Spain 7,467 744,334
Austria 3,879 308,181 Kosovo 6,609 597,693
Belgium 944 77,061 Turkey 4,512 518,293
Other 1,620 161,055 Other 53,573 5,038,211
Total 54,672 3,902,199 Total 115,024 11,059,331
Notes - Individuals are classified as foreigners if they do not have Swiss citizenship. Foreign workers are considered of different
linguistic background if their country of citizenship has a different official language with respect to the language spoken in the
linguistic area of residence in Switzerland. They are considered of same linguistic background otherwise.
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Table 2.3: Average intensity in communication skills by nationality, linguistic background and
education
Same linguistic Different linguistic t-test
background background P-value
Foreigners
Low educated 60.1 53.4 0.000
Middle educated 64.9 60.2 0.000
High educated 73.1 71.1 0.000
Natives
Low educated 60.2 56.7 0.000
Middle educated 64.8 64.9 0.919
High educated 73.9 72.2 0.000
Notes - Importance scores for communication skills come from the O*NET database. Since occupations in the O*NET database
are defined in terms of the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC), we convert them in the International Standard Classi-
fication of Occupations (ISCO-08) using the appropriate crosswalk. Then, we assign the scores to each individual in the SLFS
according to the 4-digit ISCO-08 codes. Communication skills are the average importance scores of written and oral expres-
sion and written and oral comprehension. Average scores by education, nationality and linguistic background are aggregated
weighting individual observations by hours worked times personal weight. Individuals are classified as foreigners if they do
not have Swiss citizenship. Foreign workers are considered of different linguistic background if their country of citizenship has
a different official language with respect to the language spoken in the linguistic area of residence in Switzerland. They are
considered of same linguistic background otherwise. Education groups are defined as: Low education: Compulsory education,
elementary vocational training, household work, school for general education; Middle education: Apprenticeship, full-time vo-
cational training, high school education, tertiary vocational training; High education: College education. The p-values refer to
mean comparison tests without controls. The mean comparison tests are also robust to the inclusion of education, experience,
gender and a dummy variable for European foreigners. In performing the mean comparison tests, the observations are weighted
by hours worked times personal weights.
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Table 2.6: Job specialization according to communication skills - Models A and C
Model A Model C
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log hours worked -0.022** -0.026** -0.059** -0.015 -0.011 -0.019***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Observations 114 114 114 228 228 228
Group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time by education FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Time by experience FE No No Yes No No Yes
Time by linguistic back. FE No No No No No Yes
Notes - Fixed effect estimates. All the estimates are weighted by the ratio between the number of foreign workers and the
number of native workers by cell. Model A: Group fixed effects are the interaction of education and experience fixed effects.
Model C: Group fixed effects are the interaction of education, experience and linguistic background fixed effects. The dependent
variable is the logarithm of the ratio between the average intensity of communication skills of foreigners and the average intensity
of communication skills of natives by cell. Communication skills consist of the average importance scores of written and oral
expression and written and oral comprehension. Importance scores for communication skills come from the O*NET database.
Since occupations in the O*NET database are defined in terms of the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC), we convert
them in the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08) using the appropriate crosswalk. Then, we assign
the scores to each individual in the SLFS according to the 4-digit ISCO-08 codes. The average intensity of communication skills
by cell is obtained weighting individual observations by the number of hours worked times the personal weight and averaging
them by cell. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust and clustered
at group level.
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Table 2.7: Simulated long run and short run effects on real wages (in percentage points)
PANEL A
Percentage wage impact on native workers
Column
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Long run Short run Short run Short run
1999–2017 1999–2001 2002–2008 2009–2017
Low educated 4.8 0.1 -1.6 1.0
(0.6) (0.2) (0.0) (0.4)
Middle educatd 2.7 -0.3 -0.3 -0.6
(0.3) (0.0) (0.2) (0.1)
High educated -11.5 -0.3 -6.4 -3.4
(1.6) (0.0) (0.7) (0.3)
Average natives 0.7 -0.3 -1.4 -1.4
(0.5) (0.0) (0.2) (0.2)
PANEL B
Percentage wage impact on foreign workers
Column
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Long run Short run Short run Short run
1999–2017 1999–2001 2002–2008 2009–2017
Low educated 5.8 0.1 -2.4 1.7
(0.6) (0.2) (0.1) (0.4)
Middle educated 1.8 -0.8 0.1 -1.3
(0.3) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1)
High educated -22.3 -1.1 -11.4 -5.4
(1.6) (0.0) (0.7) (0.3)
Average foreigners -3.0 -0.7 -3.3 -2.6
(0.7) (0.1) (0.3) (0.2)
Overall average 0.0 -0.3 -1.8 -1.7
(0.5) (0.0) (0.2) (0.2)
Notes - The simulated effects and standard errors are in percentage points. Years 1999–2001 correspond to the period prior
to the enactment of the free movement of persons. Years 2002-2008 correspond to the period between the enactment of the
free movement of persons and the start of the economic crisis. Years 2009-2017 correspond to the aftermath of the economic
crisis. To compute the simulated wage effects and their standard errors we start from our preferred estimates of the elasticities
of substitution. As discussed in Appendix 2.A, the relevant parameters are the inverse of the elasticities of substitution (i.e.
the estimated coefficients). For each parameter, we perform 5,000 random draws from a joint normal distribution and we
compute the percentage wage changes according to Equations (2.9) and (2.10) in Appendix 2.A. Particularly, we plug in
the normal distribution a beta coefficient of 0.010 for nationality groups, 0.085 for linguistic background groups, 0.185 for
experience groups and 0.257 for education groups. Then, we average the simulated percentage wage changes and we compute
their standard deviations. Finally, we aggregate up these average percentage wage changes weighting each education-experience-
linguistic background wage change by the relative wage share of the group. We compute standard errors by education and by
nationality using the same weighting procedure. In simulating long run effects, we consider a variation in the capital-labor ratio
equal to 0, while in simulating short run effects we consider capital as fixed, i.e. a variation in the capital-labor ratio equal to
minus the variation in the labor force due to immigration.
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Appendix
2.A Theoretical appendix
Total wage impact of immigration
To compute the percentage wage change by cell, we perform 5,000 random draws from a jointly
normal distribution using the estimated elasticities of substitution as key parameters. Following
OP, we define the mean of the normal distribution as the estimated parameter, and the standard
deviation as the estimated standard error multiplied by the square root of 12, i.e. the number of
observations. In this way we obtain 5,000 random realizations for each elasticity of substitution
and we average them across observations. Then, from Equation (2.3), at each draw we compute
the simulated percentage wage change for foreigners and natives as:
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where ∆ωFkjlt/ωFkjlt represents the percentage variation in the wage of foreign workers F in
education group k, experience group j, linguistic background group l, at time t. To the same extent,
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∆ωNkjlt/ωNkjlt represents the percentage variation in the wage of native workers. The summation
subscripts e, q, and i refer respectively to education, experience and linguistic background groups.
∆Fkjlt/Fkjlt represents the percentage variation in the number of hours worked by foreign workers,
while ∆κt/κt is the percentage variation in the capital-labor ratio, as discussed below. Finally, the
s-variables refer to the wage shares. For instance, the wage share of foreign workers in education
group k, experience group j and linguistic background group l at time t can be written as:
sFkjlt =
ωFkjltFkjlt∑3
e=1
∑2
q=1
∑2
i=1(ωFeqitFeqit + ωNeqitNeqit)
(2.11)
To the same extent, the overall wage share for education group k, experience group j and linguistic
background group l is:
skjlt =
ωFkjltFkjlt + ωNkjltNkjlt∑3
e=1
∑2
q=1
∑2
i=1(ωFeqitFeqit + ωNeqitNeqit)
(2.12)
Thus, we end up with 5,000 simulated percentage wage changes for native and foreign workers. We
compute the mean and the standard deviation of such wage changes by education, experience, and
linguistic background. Finally, we compute average percentage wage changes by education group
and their standard deviations weighting each wage change by its relative wage share. For instance,
percentage variations in native average wages by education group can be written as:
∆ω¯Nkt
ω¯Nkt
=
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ωNkqit
sNkqit
)
(2.13)
Standard errors by education group are computed averaging the standard errors in the same way.
Following the same reasoning, it is possible to obtain average percentage wage changes for native
and foreign workers, as well as the overall wage impact on the economy.
Long run and short run simulations
As discussed in the main text, while in the long run immigration flows have zero impact on wages, in
the short run immigration affects individual wages through an additional term, i.e. the capital-labor
ratio κ (see the optimality condition in Equation (2.3)). Particularly, the magnitude of this effect
can be derived from the Cobb-Douglas production function. Consider the marginal productivity of
labor:
ωt =
∂Yt
∂Lt
= αAκ
(1−α)
t (2.14)
where κ is the capital-labor ratio K/L. Assuming that total factor productivity At does not depend
on immigration flows, the percentage variation in average wages can be written as:
∆ωt
ωt
= (1− α)∆κt
κt
(2.15)
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With fixed capital, the variation in κ only depends on the denominator, i.e. the increase in the
labor force due to migration. Thus, this equation can be rewritten as:
∆ωt
ωt
= (1− α)
(
−∆Ft
 Lt
)
(2.16)
where ∆Ft represents the inflow of foreign workers in the period considered.
Accordingly, in our short run simulation we decrease the average wage effect computed in each
random draw by a constant equal to (1 − α)(∆Ft/Lt). The second term is just the percentage
change in the labor force due to foreign workers in the period considered, while the first term is the
share of income going to capital. Since in Switzerland the labor income share between 1970 and
2012 has been approximately 62% (OECD, 2016b), we assume (1− α) = 38.
2.B Further data details
This appendix contains the description of the data used. Particularly, Sections 2.B.1-2.B.4 contain
a detailed description of the criteria used to group workers into education, experience, nationality
and linguistic background groups. Then, Sections 2.B.5 and 2.B.6 describe how the labor and wage
aggregates are defined. Section 2.B.7 contains information about the Swiss Earnings Structure
Survey data, and how the shares of cross-border workers are imputed to SLFS cells. Finally,
Section 2.B.8 describes the construction of the measures of communication skills.
2.B.1 Education groups
• Low education: Compulsory education (TBQ1=1), elementary vocational training (TBQ1=2),
household work (TBQ1=3), school for general education (TBQ1=4);
• Middle education: Apprenticeship (TBQ1=5), full-time vocational training (TBQ1=6), high
school education (TBQ1=7), tertiary vocational training (TBQ1=8);
• High education: College (TBQ1=9)
2.B.2 Experience groups
We assign people to experience groups according to years of potential experience. Potential ex-
perience is computed as the difference between current age and the age at which an individual
should have completed the maximum level of education achieved. For this reason, we assume that
people enter the labor market at the age 14 if they only obtained compulsory education, at age 16 if
they accomplished elementary vocational training, household work or school for general education,
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at age 18 if they accomplished apprenticeship or full-time vocational education, at age 19 if they
obtained a high school degree, at age 22 if they accomplished tertiary vocational education and
at age 24 if they accomplished college education. Also, we drop from the sample individuals with
experience smaller than zero and greater than 40.
2.B.3 Nationality groups
National groups are defined according to citizenship. There are three ways to obtain Swiss citi-
zenship: birth, marriage and naturalization. Citizenship by birth is acknowledged to children of
Swiss parents. People married to a Swiss person can apply for fast naturalization track after three
years of marriage and at least 5 years of residence in Switzerland. Finally, every immigrant can
apply for naturalization after at least 12 years of permanence in Switzerland. Moreover, there is
a three-tiered process, in which the State Secretariat for Migration, the Cantons (i.e. the states
of the Swiss confederation) and the municipalities are all involved in the naturalization procedure.
To acquire the citizenship an immigrant must first apply to the State Secretariat for Migration,
which evaluates the applicant situation, her knowledge of Swiss customs and how much she is in-
tegrated into the Swiss society. Then, if the Secretariat decides that the applicant can receive the
citizenship, the Canton and the municipality of residence must also evaluate the application with
their own requirements. Sometimes municipalities require the applicant to undertake a written or
an oral exam. At every step of the process the naturalization of the applicant can be rejected.
2.B.4 Linguistic background groups
Linguistic background groups are defined according to the area of residence. Swiss nationals are
classified as “same linguistic background” if they complete the questionnaire in the same language
as the linguistic area of residence, while they are classified as “different linguistic background” oth-
erwise. To the same extent, immigrants are considered as “same linguistic background” when the
official language of their country of citizenship coincides with the language spoken in the linguistic
area of residence in Switzerland, and they are classified as “different linguistic background” other-
wise. Here is the list of citizenships which are considered of German, French or Italian background.
• Countries with German speaking background: Germany, Austria.
• Countries with French speaking background: France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada, Monaco,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Saint Martin (French part), Mada-
gascar, Cameroon, Senegal, Rwanda, Haiti, Chad, Guinea, Benin, Central African Republic,
Gabon, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Djibouti, Seychelles, New Caledonia, French Polyne-
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sia, Guernsey, Wallis and Futuna, French Southern and Antarctic Lands, Sark, Mauritius,
Re´union, Guadeloupe, French Guyana, Martinique, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Saint Lucia,
Saint Barthe´lemy, French Indochina, French Polynesia, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, Burundi,
Togo, Vanuatu, Cote d’Ivoire.
• Countries with Italian speaking background: Italy, San Marino, Vatican City.
2.B.5 labor aggregate
To compute the labor aggregate we:
• Drop people below 18 years old (BB03A<18);
• Drop people in military service, unemployed, in education or inactive (BDU1>9);
• Keep people with remunerated labor in the previous week (BD01=1).
To compute the total weekly hours supplied, we focus on hours actually worked and we sum hours
provided within the main job (EK08) with hours provided within the secondary job (EK08N).
Then, we drop the observations for which this sum was zero or missing. Finally, we aggregate the
hours worked multiplying the hours worked by personal weights and then summing up by cell.
2.B.6 Wages
To compute the average wages we:
• Drop people below 18 years old (BB03A<18);
• Drop people in military service, unemployed, in education or inactive (BDU1>9);
• Keep people with remunerated labor in the previous week (BD01=1).
Since in the SLFS there are only yearly data without indication of how many weeks per year the
individual worked, we divide net annual income (BWU2) by 52. Then, we drop the observations
for which income was zero and we trim the upper and lower 1% of the income distribution. Finally,
we compute real wages deflating the nominal wages by the consumer price index.
2.B.7 Cross-border workers
The Swiss Earnings Structure Survey (SESS) is a biannual survey administered to approximately
35,000 firms about the earnings of employees in the secondary and tertiary sectors, including cross-
border workers. However, since the SESS has no information about the foreign workers country
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of origin, we assume that all cross-border workers share the same linguistic background of the
linguistic area where they work. From the SESS we compute the incidence of cross-border workers
out of foreign population by cell, both for labor and wage aggregates. Then, we inflate our wage
and labor aggregates according to these shares. Finally, since the SESS is biannual, we linearly
interpolate the missing years.
2.B.8 Measures of communication skills
To measure the importance of communication skills we rely on the information contained in the
O*NET database. In particular, for each communication skill of interest we download the list of its
importance scores by occupation. Since occupations in the O*NET database are defined in terms
of the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC), we convert them in the International Standard
Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08) using the appropriate crosswalk. Then, we assign the
scores to each individual in the SLFS according to the 4-digit ISCO-08 codes. Finally, we compute
the average communication skills by cell weighting each individual by the number of hours worked
times his/her personal weight. In the following, we list the skills that we include in our baseline
and extended definitions of communication skills.
• Communication skills:
– Oral: Oral comprehension; Oral expression.
– Written: Written comprehension; Written expression.
• Extended communication skills:
– Oral: Oral comprehension; Oral expression.
– Written: Written comprehension; Written expression.
– Cognitive and analytical skills: Category flexibility; Deductive reasoning; Flexibility
of closure; Fluency of ideas; Inductive reasoning; Information ordering; Mathematical
reasoning; Memorization; Number facility; Originality; Problem sensitivity; Speed of
closure.
– Vocal skills: Speech clarity; Speech recognition.
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2.C Additional figures and tables
Figure 2.C.1: Incidence of immigrants with same and different linguistic background out of total
population by spatial mobility region
Notes - Share of immigrants with same and different linguistic background out of total population by spatial mobility region.
Individuals are classified as foreigners if they do not have Swiss citizenship. Foreign workers are considered of different linguistic
background if their country of citizenship has a different official language with respect to the language spoken in the linguistic
area of residence in Switzerland. They are considered of same linguistic background otherwise. The number of immigrants
and resident popualtion by spatial mobility region are obtained summing up individual weights. Intervals depicted in different
colors correspond to terciles.
Sources: Base maps: c©OFS, ThemaKart; Data: SLFS - year 2013.
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Table 2.C.1: Average intensity in communication skills by nationality, linguistic background and
education - extended definition
Same linguistic Different linguistic t-test
background background P-value
Foreigners
Low educated 51.3 46.8 0.000
Middle educated 55.2 51.7 0.000
High educated 62.3 60.6 0.000
Natives
Low educated 50.9 49.1 0.000
Middle educated 54.9 54.8 0.677
High educated 62.4 60.9 0.000
Notes - Importance scores for communication skills come from the O*NET database. Since occupations in the O*NET database
are defined in terms of the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC), we convert them in the International Standard Clas-
sification of Occupations (ISCO-08) using the appropriate crosswalk. Then, we assign the scores to each individual in the
SLFS according to the 4-digit ISCO-08 codes. The extended definition of communication skills is described in Appendix 2.B.8.
Average scores by education, nationality and linguistic background are aggregated weighting individual observations by hours
worked times personal weight. Individuals are classified as foreigners if they do not have Swiss citizenship. Foreign workers
are considered of different linguistic background if their country of citizenship has a different official language with respect
to the language spoken in the linguistic area of residence in Switzerland. They are considered of same linguistic background
otherwise. Education groups are defined as: Low education: Compulsory education, elementary vocational training, household
work, school for general education; Middle education: Apprenticeship, full-time vocational training, high school education,
tertiary vocational training; High education: College education. The p-values refer to mean comparison tests without controls.
The mean comparison tests are also robust to the inclusion of education, experience, gender and a dummy variable for European
foreigners. In performing the mean comparison tests, the observations are weighted by hours worked times personal weights
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Table 2.C.3: Estimated coefficients for linguistic background groups
Model C
Column (1) (2) (3)
Log of hours worked -0.068*** -0.324* -0.085***
(0.01) (0.19) (0.01)
Observations 227 227 227
Kleibergen-Paap F 145 3 433
Group fixed effects Yes Yes No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Time by education FE No Yes Yes
Linguistic, exp. and educ. FE No No Yes
Linguistic by education FE No No Yes
Notes - IV estimates using the logarithm of the number of hours provided by foreign workers as an instrument for the logarithm of
the number of hours provided. All the estimates are weighted by the number of workers in each education-experience-linguistic
background cell. Group fixed effects are the interaction of education, experience and linguistic background fixed effects.
Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table 2.C.6: Estimated coefficients for linguistic background groups holding nationality fixed
Column (1) (2) (3)
Log of hours worked -0.114* -0.146*** -0.089**
(0.06) (0.04) (0.03)
Observations 227 227 227
Group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Time by education FE No Yes Yes
Time by experience FE No No Yes
Time by nationality FE No No Yes
Notes - Fixed effect estimates. This model has been obtained inverting the linguistic background and the nationality char-
acteristics in model C. All the estimates are weighted by the ratio between the number of workers with different linguistic
background and the number of workers with same linguistic background by cell. Group fixed effects are the interaction of
education, experience and nationality fixed effects. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors
(in parenthesis) are robust and clustered at group level.
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Table 2.C.7: Job specialization according to communication skills (extended definition) - Models
A and C
Model A Model C
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log hours worked -0.018** -0.022** -0.045* -0.010 -0.006 -0.010**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Observations 114 114 114 228 228 228
Group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time by education FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Time by experience FE No No Yes No No Yes
Time by linguistic back. FE No No No No No Yes
Notes - Fixed effect estimates. All the estimates are weighted by the ratio between the number of foreign workers and the number
of native workers by cell. Model A: Group fixed effects are the interaction of education and experience fixed effects. Model C:
Group fixed effects are the interaction of education, experience and linguistic background fixed effects. The dependent variable
is the logarithm of the ratio between the average intensitity of communication skills of foreigners and the average intensity of
communication skills of natives by cell. The extended definition of communication skills includes cognitive, analytical and vocal
skills in addtion to written and oral expression and written and oral comprehension. Further details on the extended definition
of communication skills can be found in Appendix 2.B.8. Scores for communication skills come from the O*NET database.
Since occupations in the O*NET database are defined in terms of the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC), we convert
them in the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08) using the appropriate crosswalk. Then, we assign
the scores to each individual in the SLFS according to the 4-digit ISCO-08 codes. The average intensity of communication skills
by cell is obtained weighting individual observations by the number of hours worked times the personal weight and averaging
them by cell. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust and clustered
at group level.
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Table 2.C.14: Model A - Estimated coefficients for education, experience and nationality groups -
different experience groups
βnat βnat βexp βexp βedu
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
8 experience groups
Log of hours worked 0.007 0.010 -0.034*** -0.032 -0.186**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.07)
Observations 456 456 456 456 57
Kleibergen-Paap F 541 137 14
3 experience groups
Log of hours worked -0.020 -0.029 -0.048*** -0.042*** -0.154***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06)
Observations 171 171 171 171 57
Kleibergen-Paap F 530 59 15
Group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time by education FE No Yes No Yes No
Education trends No No No No Yes
Notes - βnat: Fixed effects estimates. The estimates are weighted by the ratio between the number of foreign workers and the
number of native workers by cell. Group fixed effects are the interaction of education and experience fixed effects. βexp: IV
estimates using the logarithm of the number of hours provided by foreign workers as an instrument for the logarithm of the
number of hours provided. The estimates are weighted by the number of workers in each education-experience cell. Group
fixed effects are the interaction of education and experience fixed effects. βedu: IV estimates using the logarithm of the number
of hours provided by foreign workers as an instrument for the logarithm of the number of hours provided. The estimates are
weighted by the number of workers in each education cell. Group fixed effects are just education fixed effects. Significance
levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to heteroskedasticity. Standard errors
for βnat are clustered at group level.
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Chapter 3
The role of Chinese import
competition in the employment of
migrant workers
3.1 Introduction
An increase in the competition faced by firms on the final product market can have severe con-
sequences on employment. The decrease in revenues may force firms to downsize their workforce.
However, relatively little attention has been paid to the consequences that these changes may have
on the nationality of workers employed. In the neoclassical literature changes in the economic
environment do not differentially affect the employment of native and foreign workers. Nonethe-
less, if foreign workers are not perfect substitutes for native workers, this may not necessarily be
the case. As a result, whether a shock to the product market increases or decreases the share
of foreign workers employed may have very different consequences. If the employment of foreign
workers decreases more than the employment of native workers, foreign workers may cushion the
negative occupational effects for native workers. Alternatively, if the employment of foreign workers
decreases less than the employment of native workers, the anti-immigration sentiments typically
observed during economic downturns could intensify.
This paper attempts to tackle this issue. To identify the impact of changes in product market
conditions on the nationality of workers employed, I follow the empirical strategy developed by
Autor et al. (2013). They exploit the upsurge of China as a world leading manufacturing exporter
in the early 2000s. In that period, China experienced a dramatic increase in its competitive ad-
vantage in the production of labor intensive goods. This is due to a number of factors, such as the
modernization of the Chinese industrial structure and the expansion of global trade. As a conse-
quence of this rise, the manufacturing industries of several developed countries faced an increase
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in competition from Chinese imported products. As widely discussed in the literature, in the US
the competitive pressure from Chinese imported products triggered a substantial decrease in the
manufacturing sector employment (see Acemoglu et al., 2016; Pierce and Schott, 2016; Autor et al.,
2014, 2013). Also, it induced an increase in the offshoring of production tasks and an increase in the
capital intensity of goods produced (Pierce and Schott, 2016; Bernard et al., 2006; Bustos, 2011).
Given the nature of the shock, the empirical analysis focuses on the US manufacturing sector.
This is because the manufacturing sector has been the most directly affected by the increase in
Chinese import competition. In addition, to do not confound the impact of Chinese import com-
petition with the effects of the Great Recession, the empirical analysis is limited to 2007. As in
Autor et al. (2013), this paper exploits the geographic concentration of industries. If more affected
industries are more concentrated in some specific areas, it is possible to exploit the geographical
variation in Chinese import exposure to identify the impact on employment composition. To avoid
possible endogeneity between import competition and nationality of workers employed, Chinese im-
port penetration in the US is instrumented with Chinese import penetration in other high income
countries.
Overall, there are two mechanisms in which economic downturns may affect the nationality of
workers employed. First, if foreign and native workers are imperfect substitutes and specialize in
different occupations, the increase in competition from China should decrease the employment in
industries more intensive in similar occupations. Since foreign workers are more likely to specialize
in manual tasks (see for example Peri and Sparber, 2009), they may suffer relatively more the
increase in the international trade of labor intensive goods from China. A second mechanism
involves labor market frictions. If wages are paid below the marginal productivity, an increase
in product market competition will induce firms to retain workers with greater value-for-money.
If foreign workers face stronger labor market frictions (e.g. lower outside opportunities, lower
bargaining power, etc.) and are more likely to accept lower wages for a given productivity level (or
same wage for a larger productivity level), firms facing negative shocks in the product market may
decide to retain more foreign workers.
The results show that the share of foreign workers employed increases in areas more exposed
to Chinese import competition. This effect is stronger for foreign workers who have been in the
US for a long time (more than 15 years) and for Asian and South and Central American workers.
Interestingly, the increase in import competition does not alter task specialization. If anything, the
decline in manual tasks is concentrated among native workers, who were already less specialized
in those tasks. This suggests that task specialization is not the main channel through which the
increase in import competition affects the employment of native and foreign workers. To indirectly
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test for differential labor market frictions, I exploit data on industry characteristics. Overall,
foreign workers are more concentrated in more productive industries, suggesting that differences in
the labor market may be the prevalent channel influencing the results.1
This paper exploits an international trade shock to relate the conditions faced by firms in the
product market to the nationality of workers employed. In so doing, it adds to several strands
of the literature. First of all, it adds to the migration literature. This literature mainly focuses
on the supply impact of migration on labor markets (Dustmann et al., 2017; Ottaviano and Peri,
2012; Borjas and Katz, 2007; Borjas, 2003; Card, 2001 among the others). Nevertheless, there
is a strand of the migration literature considering the role of labor demand on the employment
of migrant workers.2 However, while descriptively examining how labor demand can influence
migration inflows, this literature does not attempt to quantify the relationship between the market
conditions faced by the firms and the demand for migrant workers. This paper represents a novel
extension of the migration literature in this respect.
Second, it adds to the literature on the impact of international trade on labor markets. Papers
in this literature tackle this issue either calibrating theoretical models (as in Dix-Carneiro, 2014,
Caliendo et al., 2015, Kambourov, 2009, Cosar, 2013) or implementing reduced form identification
strategies exploiting structural breaks in trade policy (as in Autor et al., 2013, Acemoglu et al., 2016,
Pierce and Schott, 2016, Hakobyan and McLaren, 2016, Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2015). However,
this literature does not usually consider the impact of trade liberalization on the nationality of
workers employed. This paper represents an innovative extension of this literature as well. Finally,
providing evidence that labor market frictions may impact the nationality of workers employed,
this paper indirectly adds to the literature on labor market frictions.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. The following section introduces the
empirical strategy, discusses the main identification issues and describes the possible mechanisms
influencing the results. Then, Section 3.3 and 3.4 discuss the data and the main findings. Finally,
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Empirical strategy and possible mechanisms
In the early 2000s the productivity of Chinese manufacturing firms dramatically increased. In this
period China underwent profound reforms and shifted towards a market economy. At the same
time, it entered some international agreements (e.g. WTO) to decrease trade barriers and foster
1This is in line with the findings in Mitaritonna et al. (2017) and Peri (2016, 2012) suggesting that foreign workers
increase firm productivity in the destination countries.
2This literature can be traced back to Piore (1979).
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international trade. Given the size and the structure of the Chinese economy, China acquired a
strong competitive advantage in the production of labor intensive goods. As documented by Autor
et al. (2013), this resulted in large employment losses in the competing US industries. In this paper,
I replicate their identification strategy to investigate whether this startling change in international
trade patterns affected the nationality of workers employed in the US manufacturing sector.
3.2.1 Empirical strategy
Different industries are typically concentrated in different geographic areas. Autor et al. (2013)
exploit the geographic variation in industry concentration to evaluate the impact of Chinese com-
petition on US manufacturing employment. They construct a measure of import penetration ac-
cording to a simple model of international trade. Their theoretical framework does not consider
different types of labor aggregates, but can be extended to account for native and foreign workers.
Thus, I can adopt their same measure of import exposure, namely:
IPht =
∑
j
Lhjt
Ljt
Mjt
Lht
(3.1)
where Mjt is the value of imports from China in industry j at time t, while Lht, Ljt, Lhjt are respec-
tively employment aggregates by commuting zone, industry and commuting zone and industry.3 In
words, they project the value of national imports at regional level weighting import values by the
share of industry employment in each commuting zone and normalizing by the overall commuting
zone employment. Then, weighted imports are aggregated at commuting zone level summing over
industries. The main difference between the measure of import penetration in this paper and the
one used by Autor et al. (2013) is that they adopt first differences in import exposure, while for
the nature of the data I exploit in the empirical exercise, I consider import levels.
Overall, the regressions estimated in this paper have the form:
Yiht = λt + βIPht + γXiht + δh + α+ εiht (3.2)
where Yiht is a dependent variable for individual i in commuting zone h at time t and IPht is
the constructed measure of import penetration in Equation (3.1). Xiht is a set of individual level
controls, λt are time fixed effects, δh are commuting zone fixed effects and α is the constant. In the
main specification of interest, Yiht is a dummy variable equal to 1 for foreign workers. Since the
explanatory variable of interest IPht is at commuting zone level, the estimated β coefficient can be
interepreted as the impact on the share of foreign workers employed. Thus, a positive β coefficient
suggests that an increase in import exposure, and thus in competition, increases the share foreign
workers employed. A negative β coefficient suggests the opposite.
3Commuting zones are aggregates of counties with strong commuting ties.
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3.2.2 Identification issues
Nevertheless, import exposure may be correlated with unobserved factors influencing employment
and workers’ nationality. Also, the increase in Chinese import exposure may have been anticipated
by workers and firms, which could have changed their behaviour accordingly. To avoid possible bias,
Autor et al. (2013) instrument Chinese import exposure in the US with Chinese import exposure
in other high income countries. While imports from China should be positively correlated across
high income countries, imports from other countries are unlikely to be correlated with employment
in the US manufacturing sector. In this paper, the first stage of 2SLS is the same as in Autor et al.
(2013). The exclusion restriction requires that changes in import exposure in other high income
countries do not affect workers’ nationality in the US manufacturing sector. Indeed, given that
import exposure is likely to be positively correlated across high income countries, an increase in
import exposure in the US is unlikely to induce large shifts of migrants towards similarly affected
countries. Moreover, migrants deciding to move to the US face large relocating costs in changing
their destination to Europe, Japan or Australia, making such a change quite unlikely.4 Direct
Chinese migration flows to the US are also quite unlikely to influence the results, since Chinese
migration flows to the US are relatively scarce and, if anything, should decrease with the increase
in international trade between China and the US.
Thus, the instrument is constructed as:
IPht =
∑
j
Lhjt−1
Ljt−1
Mjt
Lht−1
(3.3)
whereMjt are imports from China to Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand,
Spain, and Switzerland. Employment aggregates are lagged to avoid the possibility of anticipated
changes in Chinese import exposure affecting contemporaneous labor aggregates.
Another threat to the identification strategy may come from demographic trends. If the popu-
lation of foreign workers is growing faster than the population of native workers and these trends
are reflected by employment patterns, an increasing share of foreign workers employed may be due
to the growing share of foreign population with respect to native population. However, this is not
necessarily the case. Figure 3.1 shows the share of foreign workers in 2000 and 2007 across all
economic sectors.5 Even though the share of foreign workers is increasing in all economic sectors,
the share of foreign workers among the unemployed and the inactive individuals is fairly stable.
This suggests that the share of foreign workers employed does not rise uniformly in the economy
4Notice that a large shift in migration flows in response to the increase in import competition would also affect
the exclusion restriction in the Autor et al. (2013) framework.
5Data are drawn from Census and American Community Survey and individual observations are aggregated
according to personal weights.
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and demographic effects are not likely to drive the results. Moreover, demographic trends should
be accounted for by commuting zone and year fixed effects.
3.2.3 Possible mechanisms
There are two main channels through which an increase in import competition can affect the nation-
ality of workers employed. First, the effect may take place through a shift in the tasks accomplished
by workers. According to the baseline Heckscher-Ohlin theorem applied to the international trade
of goods between China and the United States, if China gains a stronger competitive advantage
in the production of labor intensive goods, the United States will specialize in the production of
capital intensive goods. If foreign and native individuals working in the US do not specialize in
particular occupations, an international trade shock should not impact the proportion of foreign
workers employed. However, as Peri and Sparber (2009) show, foreign and native workers are likely
to specialize in different occupations. Particularly, since native workers have superior linguistic
abilities (Lewis, 2013; Gentili and Mazzonna, 2017), they are more likely to specialize in communi-
cation intensive tasks, while foreign workers are more likely to specialize in manual and cognitive
tasks. Thus, assuming that manual tasks are more concentrated in industries producing labor in-
tensive goods, an increase in the Chinese comparative advantage in labor intensive goods should
disproportionately affect foreign workers, reducing their employment.
However, there is a second possible channel through which an increase in competition from
China may induce a shift in the proportion of native and foreign workers employed. If there are
frictions in the labor market, wages are paid below the marginal productivity of workers. Within
this framework, an increase in product market competition may induce firms to retain workers
with larger value-for-money. If foreign workers have lower bargaining power in setting wages than
native workers or different value functions (for instance, foreign workers may have lower outside
opportunities, discount factors or probability of receiving a job offer), an increase in product market
competition will increase the share of foreign workers employed. Models of job search considering
different value functions for native and foreign workers have been developed by Eckstein and Wolpin
(1999), Battisti et al. (2017) and Chassamboulli and Palivos (2013). Calibrating their models, they
find that differences in labor market frictions can account for wage and employment differentials.
3.3 Data
The main sources of data are the 1990 and 2000 Census waves and the American Community
Survey (ACS) between 2005 and 2007. The time span stops to 2007 to do not confound the effects
of the increase in Chinese import competition with the effects of the Great Recession. Before 2007,
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the choice of the years is dictated by data availability. Commuting zones are the most suitable
geographical units to define local labor markets because they are defined in terms of commuting
ties. However, they are not directly reported in ACS and Census data. Individuals in 1990 and
2000 Census and in 2005-2007 ACS are geographically identified according to county, public use
microdata areas (PUMA) and state. However, counties without a sufficient number of individuals
are not reported. PUMAs are geographical units used in the sampling design of Census and ACS
and are defined in terms of counties. Since also commuting zones are defined as aggregations of
counties, each individual can be assigned to a commuting zone according to the county of residence
or the PUMA of residence. ACS data between 2001 and 2004 do not report PUMAs and individuals
cannot be related to commuting zones. The detailed attribution procedure for the available years
is described in Appendix 3.A.1.
In the empirical analysis, individual data are complemented by data on Chinese import exposure
from Autor et al. (2013), data on task intensity from the O*NET online database and data on
industry characteristics from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database by Becker et al.
(2013). Merging these datasets requires some harmonization of industry, commuting zone and
occupation codes. A detailed description of these procedures can be found in Appendix 3.A.
3.3.1 Census and ACS data
Census and ACS data provide individual level information on the nationality of workers, the indus-
try of work, occupations and annual earned income. While the nationality of workers, the broad
education group and the logarithm of annual income are exploited as dependent variables, all the
other characteristics are used as control variables in the individual level regressions. In the empirical
analysis, foreign workers are defined according to the variable Citizen. Following the literature (see
for example Ottaviano and Peri, 2012), naturalized citizens and non-citizens are classified as for-
eign workers, while individuals born abroad of American parents are classified as natives. Control
variables are dummy variables for education attainment, marital status, gender, broad occupation
category, 4-digit industry codes.6 Also, I control for age and Siegel occupational prestige score.
I restrict the sample to employed workers aged 18 or more with remunerated labor the week
before and not self-employed. Then, I only retain individuals working in the manufacturing sector
and drop individuals with missing industry codes. After this process, the overall sample size
6Dummy variables for education attainment are constructed according to the variable Educ. Dummy variables
for broad occupation categories are defined according to the variable occ1990. Particularly, I control for 6 occu-
pation categories: managerial and professional specialty occupations; technical, sales, and administrative support
occupations; service occupations; farming, forestry, and fishing occupations; precision production, craft, and repair
occupations; operators, fabricators, and laborers. More details are reported in Appendix 3.A.1. Dummy variables
for 4-digit industries are constructed as described in Appendix 3.A.1.
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amounts to roughly 2.3 million observations. Table 3.1 shows some descriptive statistics comparing
the sample of workers in the manufacturing sector to the whole sample of workers. On average,
people working in the manufacturing sector are more likely to be men, married, less educated and
to be employed as operators and laborers. Also, the average real wage per year is larger in the
manufacturing sector. To investigate the composition of foreign workers employed, I consider their
place of birth and years since arrival in the United States. Even though the share of foreign workers
in the manufacturing sector is slightly larger with respect to the overall sample, the composition of
foreign workers is fairly similar between the two samples, both in terms of place of birth and years
in the United States.
To provide a grasp of the changes in the nationality composition of manufacturing employment,
Figure 3.2 shows the trends between 2000 and 2007 in the absolute number of workers by nationality
and education. Each trend is reported on a different graph because of the large differences in scales.
The two graphs on the left depict the trends between 2000 and 2007 for highly and low educated
native workers. The decline in employment has been sharper for low educated native workers, and
around 20% of their jobs went lost. Similarly, the employment of highly educated natives declined
by 7%. On the contrary, low educated foreign workers did not face a similar decline, even though
their employment has been more volatile over time. The employment of highly educated foreign
workers has been slightly increasing (by about 100,000 jobs, 15% of the initial number). Thus, the
increasing share of foreign workers shown in Figure 3.1 seems to be related to greater layoffs among
native workers.
3.3.2 Other data sources
To construct the two measures of commuting zone import exposure defined in Equations (3.1)
and (3.3), I exploit data on import levels from the publicly available dataset by Autor et al.
(2013). Employment weights are computed from Census and ACS data, weighting each individual
observation by personal weights and aggregating them by commuting zone, industry or both.7
Figure 3.3 shows the evolution of average import exposure in the US and in other high income
countries. It is possible to see how import exposure magnified over time, especially after 2000.
Also, the two variables show a similar trend, suggesting a large positive correlation.
To explore possible changes in task specialization induced by the increase in Chinese com-
petition, I add information on occupation tasks from the O*NET database. In this database,
importance scores of each task for each occupation are constructed according to expert interviews.
7Note that the instrumental variable in Equation (3.3) is constructed with lagged employment aggregates. Thus,
to compute lagged labor aggregates for 1990, I exploit the 1980 Census.
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Occupations are classified according to the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system
and the importance of each task is rated between 0 and 100. Following Peri and Sparber (2009),
I construct the importance scores for manual, cognitive and communication tasks averaging the
importance scores of the underlying abilities. The underlying abilities are listed in Appendix 3.A.3.
Finally, to provide some descriptive evidence about possible differences between native and
foreign workers on the labor market, I also add industry information from the NBER-CES Man-
ufacturing Industry Database, a panel dataset following industry characteristics over time. The
NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database is constructed combining information from the Eco-
nomic Census and the Annual Survey of Manufactures and spans between 1958 and 2011. Industry
codes are harmonized and coded according to 6-digit NAICS. For each industry and year, it reports
data on number of workers employed, number of workers in production, value of shipments, value
added, cost of materials, cost of energy and other fuels, wages, investments in capital, inventories
and real capital stock. Since industry codes in the ACS and Census data are reported with a differ-
ent number of digits, I harmonize them according to 4-digit NAICS codes as described in Appendix
3.A.1 and collapse the information at industry level reported in the NBER-CES Manufacturing
Industry Database at 4-digit NAICS codes.
After attributing industry characteristics to each individual, I exploit information about av-
erage productivity, industry concentration and share of workers not in production. Productivity
is computed as the ratio between value added and employed workers and measures the average
ability of workers to produce value added. Industry concentration is computed normalizing value
added by value of shipments and measures the degree of monopolistic concentration of an industry.
Indeed, the smaller the incidence of value added on revenues, the stronger the competition in the
industry. On the contrary, the larger the incidence of value added on revenues, the stronger the
monopolistic concentration of the industry. Finally, since the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry
Database separately reports the number of workers employed in production, the share of workers
not in production is simply the ratio between workers not in production and employment. This ra-
tio measures the importance of production tasks by industry and may provide an indirect measure
of their offshoring.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Employment of foreign workers
Table 3.2 reports the impact of an increase in import exposure on the share of foreign workers
employed. Estimates in Column 1 are obtained controlling for year, industry and commuting zone
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fixed effects. To control for different trends over time in different states and industries, Column 2
adds state by year fixed effects, Column 3 industry by year fixed effects, and Column 4 both state
by year and industry by year fixed effects. In all the specifications, the coefficients of interest are
always positive and significant, suggesting that commuting zones more exposed to Chinese import
competition show a larger share of foreign workers employed. This is also confirmed by 2SLS results,
which are qualitatively similar to OLS estimates, even though larger in magnitude. As conjectured
in Section 3.2, the instrumental and the instrumented variables are positively correlated, with a
statistically significant first stage coefficient of 0.83 for the baseline estimate in Column 1.
The overall effect of the increase in import competition is quite large. In the baseline specifi-
cation in Column 1, a standard deviation increase in import competition exposure increases the
share of foreign workers employed by 3%, which corresponds to an increase in the mean share of
foreign workers of 18%. Even in the most demanding specification in Column 4, a standard devia-
tion increase in import exposure increases the mean share of foreign workers of 14%. Notice that
the results are not very different across the four specifications, and the adjusted R-squared does
not improve much adding controls. Thus, in the following I only control for year, industry and
commuting zone fixed effects.
Since the empirical strategy adopts the dummy variable for foreign workers as dependent vari-
able, the potential underreporting of foreign workers in Census and ACS data may lead to sample
selection bias. This concern is mitigated by the choice of the data sources, since Census and ACS
also include unauthorized immigrants. Nevertheless, as discussed by Card and Lewis (2007), in
1990 the undercount of unauthorized immigrants was larger than in 2000.8 For this reason, Table
3.B.1 reports the results excluding 1990 from the estimates. The resulting coefficient is smaller in
magnitude, but still consistent with the main estimates.9 Overall, estimates in Table 3.2 seem to
be robust to potential sample selection bias.
Now, it is interesting to understand what types of migrant workers are more concentrated in
more exposed commuting zones. Table 3.3 presents the results by migrants’ place of birth, while
Table 3.4 shows the results by time spent in the United States.10 Migrants in more exposed
commuting zones are more likely to come from Central and South America and Asia and are less
likely to come from Europe. In addition, migrants in more exposed commuting zones are the most
assimilated in the United States, since they are more likely to have been in the United States for
more than 15 years and less likely to have been in the United States for less then 5 years or between
8The undercount of Mexican workers is around 20% in 1990. From 2000 on, the undercount of unauthorized
foreign workers drops to 10%.
9Recalling Figure 3.3, information about 1990 is important to increase the variation over time in import exposure.
10Time spent in the United States is computed according to the declared year of arrival.
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5 and 10 years. These results are quite intuitive, since more exposed commuting zones are less likely
to attract recent migrant workers.
An interesting exercise is to decompose the impact of Chinese import competition on the share
of foreign workers according to the education attainment. The results reported in Table 3.5 show
that the effect is spread on both highly and low educated workers.11 Specifically, the effect is larger
among highly educated workers. Indeed, a standard deviation increase in import penetration
increases the mean share of highly educated workers by 27%. The corresponding increase in the
mean share of low educated workers is 15%.
3.4.2 Discussion of the mechanisms
As previously mentioned, there are two possible mechanisms through which changes in the structure
of the product market can affect the national composition of workers employed. The first mechanism
consists in the specialization of native and foreign workers in different tasks. Since foreign workers
are more likely to be employed in manual tasks, an increase in import competition in labor intensive
products should decrease the employment of migrant workers more than the employment of native
workers. The results of Table 3.2 suggest that this is not the main mechanism at work in this
context. However, to further confirm this intuition, Table 3.6 reports the impact of an increase in
import exposure on the average importance of manual, cognitive and communication tasks. Overall,
the importance of manual tasks is decreasing in more exposed commuting zones. A standard
deviation increase in import penetration decreases the average importance of manual tasks by 0.2%.
However, cognitive and communication tasks do not seem to be affected. Table 3.B.2 provides the
same estimates by nationality. If anything, the reallocation in tasks seems to be concentrated
among native workers. Interestingly, this happens even though the average importance of manual
tasks is smaller for natives and the average importance of communication tasks is larger. Thus,
even though some task reallocation can still be in place, it is not the main channel through which
an increase in import competition from China affects the nationality of workers employed.
The second channel through which the increase in import competition may have impacted the
employment of foreign workers is related to different labor market frictions for native and foreign
workers. If foreign workers are paid less for the same tasks or if they are more productive for the
same salaries, firms will tend to retain more foreign workers than native workers. This may be the
case if foreign workers face different outside opportunities, have lower bargaining power or have
different employment opportunities. Testing directly for such characteristics requires calibrating a
11Highly educated workers are defined as workers with at least some college education, while low educated workers
are defined as workers with high school diploma or less.
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search model. Such an exercise is beyond the scope of this paper and is accurately done in Battisti
et al. (2017) for 20 developed countries. However, to provide some more descriptive insights on this
channel, I exploit the information from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database to check
whether there are observed differences in the industries of work of native and foreign workers.
Table 3.7 reports sample averages by industry characteristics and nationality of workers, weight-
ing by individual personal weights. Industry productivity, industry concentration and share of
workers not in production are drawn from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. The
logarithm of annual wages, instead, is based on the salary reported in the ACS and Census data.
Since the increase in foreign workers seems to be concentrated among foreign workers arrived in
the United States more than 15 years ago, Columns (2) and (3) report average characteristics sepa-
rately for them. On average, foreign workers are more concentrated in more productive industries.
Interestingly, there can be different mechanisms at work for recent foreign workers and non-recent
foreign workers, both leading to the same results. On the one hand, recent foreign workers are paid
around 11,000 dollar per year less than other workers. On the other hand, non-recent foreign work-
ers are more concentrated in more productive industries. In both cases foreign workers are a better
investment for firms. Notice that the greater concentration of foreign workers in more productive
industries holds regardless of Chinese import penetration. In a further check (not reported) I con-
sider individuals living in the 10% of commuting zones more exposed to Chinese import competition
and the 10% of commuting zones less exposed in 1990 and 2007. In all cases, foreign workers are
more concentrated in more productive industries than native workers.
3.4.3 Other dependent variables
To provide a broader picture of the changes in workforce composition induced by the increase in
Chinese import penetration, Table 3.8 and 3.9 show the impact on wages and on the share of
highly educated workers employed. In Table 3.8 results are reported separately by nationality and
education. Overall, wages are increasing in the manufacturing sector. This is in line with the
results by Autor et al. (2013), who find negative wage effects on the overall economy, but positive
and statistically non-significant wage effects in the manufacturing sector. This is probably due to
the fact that firms only retain more productive workers or that only more productive firms are
able to survive to Chinese import competition. Particularly, the increase in wages is concentrated
among highly educated workers. A standard deviation increase in import penetration increases the
average log wages of highly educated native and foreign workers by 0.2%, which roughly corresponds
to an increase in 800 dollars per year. Results using weekly wages rather than annual wages are
qualitatively similar (Table 3.B.3).
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In addition, the jobs lost because of Chinese import competition are concentrated among lower
paid workers. Table 3.9 shows the impact of Chinese import competition on the share of highly
educated workers. Overall, a standard deviation increase in import penetration increases the mean
share of highly educated workers of 0.1%. Distinguishing by nationality, the effect seems to be
concentrated among natives, although it is quite small in magnitude. This reinforces the previous
findings on wages, suggesting that the readjustment is mainly concentrated among low educated
workers.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper investigates whether changes in the economic structure of product markets affect the
nationality of workers employed. The empirical strategy exploits exposure to Chinese import com-
petition between 1990 and 2007. As in Autor et al. (2013), I construct a measure of regional
exposure to Chinese import competition. To deal with the potential endogeneity of import expo-
sure with respect to employment, imports from China to the US are instrumented with imports
from China to other eight high income countries. While the decrease in US manufacturing employ-
ment is widely documented in the literature, in investigating the nationality of workers retained by
the manufacturing industries, this paper finds that the share of foreign workers employed increases
in areas more exposed to Chinese import competition.
There are two possible mechanisms through which a shock to the product market can influence
the employment of migrant workers: task specialization and differential labor market frictions.
Overall, areas more exposed to Chinese import competition show a little decrease in manual inten-
sive tasks. However, the effect is small and when decomposing between native and foreign workers,
it seems to be concentrated among native workers. This suggests that task specialization is not the
main mechanism through which the labor market readjusts to the shock. Considering average in-
dustry characteristics by workers’ nationality, foreign workers are concentrated in more productive
industries with respect to native workers. Thus, firms surviving to Chinese import competition
probably attempt to decrease their labor costs retaining the more productive workers, i.e. foreign
workers. Interestingly, this paper also shows that migration has a long standing impact, since
foreign workers in the US for more than 15 years seem to maintain their greater productivity.
These results have strong policy implications. First, they are relevant for the design of policies
altering the competitive structure of product markets. Indeed, if the increase in trade following a
market liberalization does not improve the productive capacity of the economy, firms may not only
be forced to downsize their employment stock, but also to readjust towards specific components of
their workforce. In the case of foreign workers, this could exacerbate anti-immigration feelings in
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the native population, raising social tensions. Second, these results can be relevant for the design
of migration policies, since firms are benefiting from the employment of migrant workers. Indeed,
in times of increasing competitive pressures, the employment of migrant workers allow firms to
decrease their marginal cost of labor and to maintain their competitiveness on the final product
market. The employment of migrant workers may not only be a source of short term profit for firms,
but can also insure them against future negative shocks. In this respect, migration policies may
have lasting consequences in the long run, since foreign workers maintain their greater productivity
even after being assimilated in the destination country. Whether it is better favoring firms or
protecting native workers is an open political issue.
Before concluding, it is worth emphasizing that these results are short term consequences of an
increase in product market competition. In the long run, the economy can readjust and reabsorb
the displaced native workers. Moreover, the evidence presented in this paper may be contingent to
the peculiar economic context. Nevertheless, policy makers should keep in mind these dynamics as
possible outcomes of an increase in competitive pressures.
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Figure 3.1: Share of foreign workers by sector
Notes - Foreign workers are defined as naturalized citizens and non-citizens. All the other individuals are regarded as natives.
Sectors are defined according to the first figure of NAICS codes. “Agriculture” includes individuals working in industries
beginning with 1, “Mining and construction” includes individuals working in industries beginning with 2, etc. Other services
includes industries beginning with 7 (“Arts, entertainment, and recreation” and “Accommodation and food services”), 8 (“Other
services”), and 9 (“Public administration”). Shares are computed weighting each observation by personal weights. Individuals
below 18 years old are excluded from the sample.
Sources: Census and ACS - years 2000 and 2007.
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Figure 3.2: Trends in manufacturing sector employment by nationality and education
Notes - The sample is restricted to employed workers in the manufacturing sector, older than 18, with remunerated work the
week before and not self-employed. Foreign workers are defined as naturalized citizens and non-citizens. Numbers of workers
are obtained weighting each observation by individual personal weights and are reported in thousands.
Sources: Census and ACS - years 2000-2007.
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Figure 3.3: Average Chinese import penetration by year
Notes - Chinese import penetration in the US and in other high income countries over time. The other high income countries
are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland. Chinese import penetration in the
US is computed as in Equation (3.1). Chinese import penetration in other high income countries is computed as in Equation
(3.3). Employment weights in Equation (3.3) are lagged one period. However, plotting unweighted import values in the US
and in other high income countries gives a similar graphical result. Individual data are aggregated using personal weights.
Sources: Import data from Autor et al. (2013) - years 1990, 2000, 2005-2007.
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Table 3.1: Comparison of individual characteristics across samples
Manufacturing sector Whole sample
Share men 0.69 0.53
Share married 0.62 0.55
Share some college education 0.42 0.54
Age 41 40
Average income 37,922 35,719
Share foreign born 0.16 0.14
Share foreign born from South and Central America 0.09 0.07
Share foreign born from Asia 0.05 0.04
Share foreign born from Europe 0.02 0.02
Share foreign born from Africa 0.003 0.005
Share foreign born arrived less than 5 years ago 0.02 0.02
Share foreign born arrived btw. 5-10 years ago 0.03 0.03
Share foreign born arrived btw. 10-20 years ago 0.06 0.05
Share foreign born arrived more than 20 years ago 0.05 0.04
Siegel occupational prestige score 38 41
Managerial occupations 0.21 0.29
Technical, sale and administrative support 0.18 0.31
Service occupations 0.02 0.14
Precision production, craft and repair 0.18 0.10
Operators, fabricators, and laborers 0.41 0.14
Observations 2,284,550 14,068,573
Notes - The whole sample contains employed workers older than 18, with remunerated work the week before, not self-employed
and with non-missing industry of work (NAICS). The sample for the manufacturing sector only contains individuals working
in the manufacturing sector (NAICS beginning with 3). Occupational categories are defined according to 1990 Census Bureau
classification scheme as reported in the ACS and Census variable occ1990. See footnote 6 for further details on occupational
categories.
Sources: Census and ACS - years 1990, 2000, 2005-2007.
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Table 3.2: Impact of exposure to Chinese import competition on the share of foreign workers
Column (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS estimates
Import penetration 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0008)
2SLS estimates
Import penetration 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0040∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0040∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0017) (0.0008) (0.0016)
Individual level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commuting zone f.e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year f.e. No Yes No Yes
Industry-year f.e. No No Yes Yes
Observations 2,284,550 2,284,550 2,284,550 2,284,550
R-squared 0.303 0.305 0.304 0.306
Kleibergen-Paap F 257 82 273 84
Mean foreign 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Std. dev. import penetration 5.71 5.71 5.71 5.71
Notes - The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 for foreign workers. Foreign workers are defined as naturalized citizens
and non-citizens. Import penetration by commuting zone is the weighted sum of US imports from China across industries
divided by the employment of the commuting zone as in Equation (3.1). The instrumental variable adopted is the import
penetration of China into other high income countries computed as in Equation (3.3). The other high income countries are
Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland. Individual level controls are gender,
age, educational attainment, marital status, Siegel occupational prestige score and occupational categories. Regressions are
weighted according to individual personal weights. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors
(in parenthesis) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at state level.
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Table 3.3: Impact of exposure to Chinese import competition on the share of foreign workers by
place of birth
South and Asia Europe Africa
Central
America
Column (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS estimates
Import penetration 0.0021*** 0.0020*** -0.0002** 0.0000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
2SLS estimates
Import penetration 0.0035*** 0.0025*** -0.0005*** 0.0000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Individual level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commuting zone f. e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,284,550 2,284,550 2,284,550 2,284,550
R-squared 0.316 0.101 0.027 0.007
Kleibergen-Paap F 257 257 257 257
Mean dep. variable 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.003
Std. dev. import penetration 5.71 5.71 5.71 5.71
Notes - Dependent variables are dummies equal to 1 according to the continent of birth of foreign workers. Foreign workers
are defined as naturalized citizens and non-citizens. Import penetration by commuting zone is the weighted sum of US imports
from China across industries divided by the employment of the commuting zone as in Equation (3.1). The instrumental variable
adopted is the import penetration of China into other high income countries computed as in Equation (3.3). The other high
income countries are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland. Individual level
controls are gender, age, educational attainment, marital status, Siegel occupational prestige score and occupational categories.
Regressions are weighted according to individual personal weights. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at state level.
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Table 3.5: Impact of exposure to Chinese import competition on the share of foreign workers by
education group
Highly educ. Low educ.
Column (1) (2)
OLS estimates
Import penetration 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0007)
2SLS estimates
Import penetration 0.0059∗∗∗ 0.0051∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0014)
Individual level controls Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Commuting zone f. e. Yes Yes
Observations 920,537 1,364,013
R-squared 0.160 0.407
Kleibergen-Paap F 228 255
Mean foreign 0.13 0.18
Std. dev. import penetration 5.98 5.49
Notes - The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 for foreign workers. Foreign workers are defined as naturalized citizens
and non-citizens. Highly educated workers are workers with at least some college education, while low educated workers are
workers with high school diploma or less. Import penetration by commuting zone is the weighted sum of US imports from
China across industries divided by the employment of the commuting zone as in Equation (3.1). The instrumental variable
adopted is the import penetration of China into other high income countries computed as in Equation (3.3). The other high
income countries are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland. Individual level
controls are gender, age, educational attainment, marital status, Siegel occupational prestige score and occupational categories.
Regressions are weighted according to individual personal weights. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at state level.
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Table 3.6: Impact of exposure to Chinese import competition on task intensity
Manual Cognitive Communic.
Column (1) (2) (3)
OLS estimates
Import penetration -0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0010 0.0062∗∗
(0.0033) (0.0038) (0.0028)
2SLS estimates
Import penetration -0.0108∗∗ -0.0014 0.0019
(0.0052) (0.0044) (0.0037)
Individual level controls Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Commuting zone f. e. Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,284,550 2,284,550 2,284,550
R-squared 0.868 0.804 0.787
Kleibergen-Paap F 257 257 257
Mean dep. variable 28.22 46.04 58.44
Std. dev. import penetration 5.71 5.71 5.71
Notes - Dependent variables are the average importance of manual, cognitive and communication tasks (detailed list in Appendix
3.A.3). Import penetration by commuting zone is the weighted sum of US imports from China across industries divided by
the employment of the commuting zone as in Equation (3.1). The instrumental variable adopted is the import penetration
of China into other high income countries computed as in Equation (3.3). The other high income countries are Australia,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland. Individual level controls are gender, age, educational
attainment, marital status, Siegel occupational prestige score and occupational categories. Regressions are weighted according
to individual personal weights. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at state level.
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Table 3.7: Average industry characteristics
Foreigners Foreigners
Natives <15 years ≥ 15 years
in the US in the US
Column (1) (2) (3)
Productivity (VA/emp) 196.81 253.17 277.73
Industry concentration (VA/revenues) 0.51 0.51 0.52
Share of workers not in production 0.31 0.31 0.33
Annual wages (in logarithm) 10.29 9.85 10.19
Notes - Productivity is computed as the ratio between inflation-adjusted value added and employment. Industry concentration
is computed as the ratio between inflation-adjusted value added and value of shipments. Productivity, industry concentration
and share of workers not in production come from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. Value added, value of
shipments, employment and share of workers not in production are assigned to each individual according to the 4-digit industry
of work. The logarithm of annual wages comes from ACS and Census data. Averages are computed weighting each observation
by personal weights.
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Table 3.8: Impact of exposure to Chinese import competition on wages by education and nationality
Foreigners Natives
Highly educ. Low educ. Highly educ. Low educ.
Column (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS estimates
Import penetration 0.0054∗∗∗ 0.0022 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0012
(0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0011)
2SLS estimates
Import penetration 0.0037∗ 0.0017 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0004
(0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0014)
Individual level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commuting zone f. e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 99,470 181,425 821,067 1,182,588
R-squared 0.399 0.223 0.374 0.261
Kleibergen-Paap F 126 757 241 121
Mean dep. variable 10.54 9.73 10.59 10.05
Std. dev. import penetration 6.99 6.54 5.70 5.06
Notes - The dependent variables are the logarithm of yearly wages. Foreign workers are defined as naturalized citizens and
non-citizens. Highly educated workers are workers with at least some college education, while low educated workers are workers
with high school diploma or less. Import penetration by commuting zone is the weighted sum of US imports from China across
industries divided by the employment of the commuting zone as in Equation (3.1). The instrumental variable adopted is the
import penetration of China into other high income countries computed as in Equation (3.3). The other high income countries
are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland. Individual level controls are gender,
age, educational attainment, marital status, Siegel occupational prestige score and occupational categories. Regressions are
weighted according to individual personal weights. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors
(in parenthesis) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at state level.
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Table 3.9: Impact of exposure to Chinese import competition on the share of highly educated
workers
All Foreign Native
Column (1) (2) (3)
OLS estimates
Import penetration 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0004 0.0001*
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0000)
2SLS estimates
Import penetration 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0005 0.0001***
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0000)
Individual level controls Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Commuting zone f. e. Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,284,550 280,895 2,003,655
R-squared 0.974 0.911 0.991
Kleibergen-Paap F 257 363 171
Mean dep. variable 0.42 0.35 0.43
Std. dev. import penetration 5.71 6.71 5.35
Notes - Dependent variables are dummies equal to 1 if the worker has at least 1 year of college education. Import penetration by
commuting zone is the weighted sum of US imports from China across industries divided by the employment of the commuting
zone as in Equation (3.1). The instrumental variable adopted is the import penetration of China into other high income
countries computed as in Equation (3.3). The other high income countries are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan,
New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland. Individual level controls are gender, age, educational attainment, marital status, Siegel
occupational prestige score and occupational categories. Regressions are weighted according to individual personal weights.
Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustered at state level.
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Appendix
3.A Data, crosswalks and harmonization procedures
3.A.1 ACS and Census data
Occupation codes
Dummy variables for occupation categories are constructed according to the variable occ1990. Cat-
egories are constructed as follows:
- Managerial and professional specialty occupations: codes between 002 and 200;
- Technical, sales, and administrative support occupations: codes between 201 and 390;
- Service occupations: codes between 400 and 469;
- Farming, forestry, and fishing occupations: codes between 470 and 500;
- Precision production, craft, and repair occupations: codes between 501 and 700;
- Operators, fabricators, and laborers: codes between 701 and 900.
Industry codes
From 2000 on, industries are coded according to the North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS) at different levels of precision.12 To obtain homogeneous industry categories, I convert
all the NAICS codes into 4-digit NAICS codes, retaining the first 4 digits of 5- and 6-digit NAICS
codes, and randomly assigning 1-, 2-, and 3-digit NAICS codes to 4-digit NAICS subcategories.
Industries in the 1990 Census, instead, are reported according to the Census industry classification
system. 1990 Census industry codes are converted into NAICS codes through the concordance
table provided by the Census Bureau.
Commuting zones
Since commuting zones are aggregations of counties with homogenous labor markets, assigning a
commuting zone to each individual in the Census waves and in the ACS requires knowledge of
the county of residence of the individual. Nevertheless, for privacy reasons, in the ACS and Cen-
12NAICS codes vary between 1 and 6 digits according to the precision of industry definition.
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sus waves individual counties are only reported when the numerosity of individuals by county is
sufficiently high. For the other observations, the smaller geographic unit available is the Public
Use Microdata Area (PUMA). Thus, when counties are present, commuting zones are assigned
according to the crosswalk between commuting zones and counties available in the David Dorn
data page. If counties are not available, the procedure is slightly more complicated, since the bor-
ders of PUMAs are not perfectly overlapping with commuting zones. This means that the same
PUMA can be split over different commuting zones and vice versa. The David Dorn data page
also provides the necessary crosswalks between PUMAs and commuting zones.13 These crosswalks
are based on a probabilistic matching and provide employment weights indicating the share of the
PUMA population that should be assigned to each corresponding commuting zone. Thus, when
only PUMAs are available, individuals are randomly assigned to each commuting zone according
to the probabilistic weights defined by Dorn.14
To compute lagged labor aggregates in Equation (3.3), I assign commuting zones to individuals
in the 1980 Census as well. In the 1980 Census PUMAs are not defined, but there are other
geographic units, county groups, that allow for the attribution of commuting zones to individuals.
The appropriate crosswalk between 1980 county groups and commuting zones is still provided by
David Dorn in his data page.
3.A.2 Data on import exposure
SIC-NAICS crosswalk for import data
Import data from Autor et al. (2013) are available from 1991 to 2007 and are provided according to
the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. To convert SIC codes into NAICS codes, I
use the SIC-NAICS crosswalk provided by David Dorn. However, since a NAICS code may overlap
with more than one SIC code, I deterministically assign import values dividing the value of imports
by the number of corresponding NAICS codes. Finally, I aggregate imports by 4-digit NAICS codes
and attach them to individual observations.15
3.A.3 O*NET
Occupation codes
Occupation codes in the O*NET are reported according to the 2010 Standard Occupational Clas-
sification (SOC) version. Since occupations in the 2000 Census and ACS are reported according to
13Since PUMA codes are not consistent over time, two different crosswalks are provided for year 1990 and for years
from 2000 on. These crosswalks have already been applied in Autor and Dorn (2013) and Dorn (2009).
14Following Autor et al. (2013), I remove from the sample individuals belonging to the commuting zones of Alaska
and Hawaii.
15Individuals in the 1990 Census are assigned import levels of 1991.
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the 2000 SOC version, I convert the 2010 SOC codes in the O*NET to 2000 SOC codes through
the 2000-2010 SOC crosswalk provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Then, since occupations in the 1990 Census are not reported according to SOC, I perform some
additional steps. The IPUMS website provides a crosswalk between 2000 occupation codes and SOC
codes for the 2000 Census. Thus, to assign 2000 SOC codes to individuals in the 1990 Census, I first
convert 1990 occupation codes to 2000 occupation codes and then 2000 occupation codes to 2000
SOC codes. Particularly, I uniform 1990 occupation codes to 2000 occupation codes through the
crosswalk between occ1990 and contemporary occupation codes provided by the IPUMS website.
If an occupation code in 1990 corresponds to more than one occupation code in 2000, I randomly
assign individuals to the corresponding 2000 occupation codes. Finally, I exploit the occupation
descriptions to manually assign individuals in occupations without direct correspondence. This
manual and random assignment only involved 6% of individuals working in the manufacturing sec-
tor in the 1990 Census. To complete the matching, since SOC occupations in ACS and Census
waves are not always reported according to 6-digit SOC codes but are reported at 5-, 4- or 3-digit
SOC codes, I average importance scores from the O*NET at lower digit level and attribute the aver-
age importance scores accordingly. SOC codes with less than 6 digits are around 15% of the dataset.
List of tasks
Manual tasks: arm-hand steadiness, manual dexterity, finger dexterity, control precision, multil-
imb coordination, response orientation, rate control, reaction time, wrist-finger speed, speed of limb
movement, extent flexibility, dynamic flexibility, gross body coordination, gross body equilibrium,
static strength, explosive strength, dynamic strength, trunk strength, stamina.
Cognitive tasks: category flexibility, fluency of ideas, originality, problem sensitivity, mathe-
matical reasoning, number facility, deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, information ordering,
memorization, speed of closure, flexibility of closure.
Communication tasks: oral comprehension, oral expression, written comprehension, written
expression.
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3.B Additional tables
Table 3.B.1: Impact of exposure to Chinese import competition on the share of foreign workers
without 1990
OLS 2SLS
Column (1) (2)
Import penetration 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0007)
Individual level controls Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Commuting zone f. e. Yes Yes
Observations 1,336,772 1,336,772
R-squared 0.314 0.314
Kleibergen-Paap F 95
Mean foreign 0.17 0.17
Std. dev. import penetration 4.99 4.99
Notes - The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 for foreign workers. Foreign workers are defined as naturalized citizens
and non-citizens. Import penetration by commuting zone is the weighted sum of US imports from China across industries
divided by the employment of the commuting zone as in Equation (3.1). The instrumental variable adopted is the import
penetration of China into other high income countries computed as in Equation (3.3). The other high income countries are
Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland. Individual level controls are gender,
age, educational attainment, marital status, Siegel occupational prestige score and occupational categories. Regressions are
weighted according to individual personal weights. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors
(in parenthesis) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at state level.
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Table 3.B.3: Impact of exposure to Chinese import competition on weekly wages by education and
nationality
Foreigners Natives
Highly educ. Low educ. Highly educ. Low educ.
Column (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS estimates
Import penetration 0.0053∗∗∗ 0.0015 0.0038∗∗∗ 0.0008
(0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0009)
2SLS estimates
Import penetration 0.0032 0.0011 0.0039∗∗∗ -0.0005
(0.0025) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Individual level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commuting zone f. e. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 99,470 181,425 821,067 1,182,588
R-squared 0.418 0.237 0.390 0.271
Kleibergen-Paap F 126 757 241 121
Mean dep. variable 6.69 5.94 6.71 6.22
Std. dev. import penetration 6.99 6.54 5.70 5.06
Notes - The dependent variables are the logarithm of weekly wages. Foreign workers are defined as naturalized citizens and
non-citizens. Highly educated workers are workers with at least some college education, while low educated workers are workers
with high school diploma or less. Import penetration by commuting zone is the weighted sum of US imports from China across
industries divided by the employment of the commuting zone as in Equation (3.1). The instrumental variable adopted is the
import penetration of China into other high income countries computed as in Equation (3.3). The other high income countries
are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland. Individual level controls are gender,
age, educational attainment, marital status, Siegel occupational prestige score and occupational categories. Regressions are
weighted according to individual personal weights. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors
(in parenthesis) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at state level.
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